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This Article takes a fresh look at the power of courts and creditors to 
force debtors to repay their obligations through in personam collection 
techniques. Variously known as “debtor’s examinations,” “turnover 
orders,” “citations to discover assets,” “supplementary proceedings,” 
“proceedings supplementary,” and “proceedings in aid of execution,” in 
personam remedies force the debtor, under threat of the court’s contempt 
authority, to turn over money or property directly to a creditor. Because 
the exercise of the court’s contempt authority can result in a debtor’s 
imprisonment, in personam techniques have long been regarded as a 
critical but potentially very coercive arrow in a debt collector’s quiver.  
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission and others have endorsed 
major changes to a debt collection system labeled as “broken.” These 
reform proposals, however, have overlooked key problems in in personam 
proceedings, where excessive creditor leverage and insufficient protection 
of debtors’ procedural rights risk validating a view that the judicial 
system is functioning as creditors’ private collection arm.  
Following the transfer of power to a newly established Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection, this Article resurrects a subject that 
has received virtually no attention in the scholarly literature for over a 
decade. It analyzes the particular features of in personam proceedings 
and debtor behavior that contribute to a longstanding imbalance in the 
leverage asserted by creditors over debtors. The Article recommends 
specific changes to the way courts conduct in personam proceedings to 
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ensure that the in terrorem effects of these remedies do not upend 
important social policies, including the protection of exempt property 
and the adjudicative fairness of the collection process. 
Debt collection is a fundamental component of the consumer credit 
system. The strength and legitimacy of its procedures, however, depend 
on maintaining a difficult balance between the state’s and creditors’ 
interest in rigorous judgment enforcement and debtors’ interest in 
imposing reasonable limitations on the coerciveness of debt collection. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1511 
II. INTRODUCTION TO IN PERSONAM DEBT COLLECTION 
ACTIONS ........................................................................ 1522 
A. The Common Law Predecessors of Modern In 
Personam Collection Actions: Creditors’ Bills ........... 1522 
B. The Risk of Imprisonment in In Personam Actions ..... 1525 
III. FACTORS COMPLICATING IN PERSONAM DEBT 
COLLECTION .................................................................. 1528 
A. In Personam Debt Collection as an “Extraordinary” 
Remedy .................................................................... 1528 
B. An “Extraordinary” Remedy and Its Extraordinarily 
Ordinary Use Against Debtors ................................. 1529 
C. Predictable Lapses in Debtors’ Behavior ..................... 1534 
1. Showing up is half the battle: How debtors’ 
absence raises the stakes ...................................... 1534 
2. Debtors’ unfamiliarity with exemptions ................ 1536 
IV. REDUCING THE HARMS OF AND IMPROVING THE LAWS 
GOVERNING IN PERSONAM DEBT COLLECTION ............. 1538 
A. The Normative Harms of Excessively Coercive Debt 
Collection ................................................................ 1539 
B. “Contempt Confusion”: Conflating Imprisonment for 
Failure to Show Up and Imprisonment for Failure to 
Pay Up ..................................................................... 1543 
1. How the law treats nonpayment and 
nonappearance contempt differently .................... 1543 
2. The functional similarities between nonappearance 
and nonpayment contempt ................................. 1545 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:10 PM 
1509 Creditors’ Contempt 
 1511 
C. The Inadequacy of Proposed Reforms ........................ 1548 
D. Recommendations ..................................................... 1550 
1. How turning over bond payments to creditors 
perpetuates contempt confusion .......................... 1550 
2. Putting your money where your mouth is: 
Protecting debtors’ exempt property to sustain 
exemption laws’ normative goals ......................... 1552 
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 1558 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Times were tough for Melanie Vargas. Having recently separated 
from her husband of seven years, Melanie was having difficulty 
adjusting to a reduced household income and a leaner budget. 
Forced to rely more heavily on credit cards, she devoted an 
increasing percentage of her income to servicing her debt, which had 
ballooned recently due to the application of a default interest rate 
and various late fees. 
To Melanie, creditors’ debt collection efforts seemed 
unrelenting. Collectors called at least ten times every day. The daily 
mail was brimming with letters stamped with phrases like “Final 
Notice” or “Past Due.” Feeling powerless about her financial 
situation and frustrated by the holier-than-thou tone of debt 
collectors in their admonitions and settlement offers, Melanie grew 
numb. Craving some peace, she eventually changed her home phone 
number and began forwarding her mail to a post office box.1 She felt 
embarrassed that everyone from the babysitter to the postman knew 
she was having trouble making ends meet. 
Meanwhile, one of Melanie’s creditors charged off2 the debt and 
sold it at a fraction3 of its face value to a debt buyer, who purchased 
 
 1. It is not unusual for debtors to fail to respond to creditors’ efforts to reach them 
through phone and the mail. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another 
Boom—in Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (citing CEO of debt buyer Encore 
Capital Group, Inc., who asserts that only six percent of the company’s debtors respond to 
dunning letters, and only eighteen percent respond to phone calls). 
 2. At any stage of the collection process, a creditor may “write” or “charge” off a debt 
for tax and accounting purposes, either because the debt is uncollectible or because no 
payment has been received for a certain period of time. ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT 
COLLECTION § 1.5.12, at 14 (6th ed. 2008).  
 3. See, e.g., JONATHAN SHELDON, CAROLYN CARTER & CHI CHI WU, COLLECTION 
ACTIONS: DEFENDING CONSUMERS AND THEIR ASSETS, § 1.4.1, at 4 (1st ed. 2008) 
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distressed debt4 at high volumes and used both legal and extralegal 
(nonlitigation) methods to extract payments from borrowers. 
The debt buyer’s law firm filed an action against Melanie in small 
claims court, and since Melanie did not show up to the court 
hearing, the firm obtained a default judgment5 against her for 
$2,300. The court attempted to serve Melanie via certified mail, but, 
on her more stressful days, Melanie refused to accept certified mail: 
it almost always meant bad news.  
One day in February, another summons from the court arrived. 
It informed Melanie that the debt buyer had instituted an in 
personam6 debt collection action against her. Melanie was required 
to go to court, answer questions about her bank account, and 
disclose what other assets she owned. She was required to bring 
various financial records with her.  
Melanie did not go to court. Unaware that her debt had been 
sold and that the debt buyer had recovered a default judgment 
against her, Melanie did not recognize the plaintiff ’s name on the 
summons. Also, aside from some traffic violations during her teenage 
years, Melanie’s experience with the legal system was limited. She 
assumed she could not really improve the situation by going to 
court. With no paid vacation days, too, she knew that a court trip 
would require her to forfeit half a day’s pay. This was too steep a 
price, given Melanie’s tight budget.7 
 
(reporting that certain debt buyers purchase defaulted accounts for approximately 2 to 5.3 
cents a dollar).  
 4. Distressed debt refers to loans on which debtors have defaulted. See Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 1, at A1. 
 5. Default judgments against debtors are very common. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT 
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 7 (2010) [hereinafter FTC] (estimating that 
sixty to ninety-five percent of debt collection lawsuits result in a default judgment). 
 6. The terminology of in personam debt collection remedies varies significantly from 
state to state. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1402 (2008) (“supplementary 
proceedings”); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2333 (West 2010) (“proceedings in aid of 
execution”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(b)(1) (West 2005) (“turn over” 
orders); Merkel v. Keller, No. 102239, 2010 WL 2670846, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. June 25, 
2010) (“judgment-debtor examination”); IND. R. TRIAL P. 69(E) (“proceedings supplemental 
to execution”). 
 7. Creditors and consumer advocates disagree about the causes of debtors’ low 
participation rate in collection proceedings. While consumer advocates cite as contributing 
factors improper service (i.e., “sewer service”), the incomprehensibility of communications 
from the court, debtors’ fears about the legal system, lack of access to counsel, work and family 
constraints, and a lack of transportation, creditors contend that debtors opt not to participate 
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Two weeks later, Melanie was served personally at her apartment 
with a letter from the court. The court had issued a rule to show 
cause8—a document instructing Melanie to appear in court and 
explain why she should not be held in contempt.9 Melanie ignored 
this notice, too. One week later, the court issued a body attachment 
writ.10 The court, pursuant to its contempt authority, had authorized 
local law enforcement officials to arrest Melanie for failing to show 
up to court. She was asked to surrender herself to the local 
authorities and post bond, a portion of which would be turned over 
to the creditor in satisfaction of its judgment.11 
Alarmed at how the situation had escalated, Melanie called her 
parents, explaining the situation and asking for a loan. Since her 
parents could only afford to lend her a few dollars, Melanie 
scrounged up the rest by selling some gold jewelry and taking out a 
payday loan—a loan with a 350% annual percentage rate.12 She 
 
after concluding that defending against a valid debt would be futile. See FTC, supra note 5, at 
7. “Sewer service” occurs when a process server fails to serve the consumer but falsely asserts 
that he has successfully done so. Id. at 8. This act of falsifying an affidavit of service is called 
“sewer service” because it is akin to the process server throwing the documents “down the 
sewer”. Id. at 8 n.22. 
 8. A rule to show cause may also be known as an “order to show cause” or a “show-
cause order.” E.g., Merkel, 2010 WL 2670846, at *2. 
 9. See, e.g., 20A BRENT A. OLSON, MINNESOTA BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 39:7 
(2010-2011 ed.) (“If the judgment debtor fails to appear in violation of the subpoena or the 
order in supplementary proceedings, an Order to Show Cause why he should not be held in 
contempt of court should be obtained ex parte and served on the judgment debtor.”). 
 10. A judge may issue either a writ of “body attachment” or a “bench warrant” 
following a debtor’s failure to appear at an in personam proceeding. See, e.g., Hi-Tech Constr. 
Inc. v. Ma, No. A126752, 2011 WL 664657, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011) (“[The 
debtor] has also failed to appear at a judgment debtor’s exam, resulting in the issuance of a 
bench warrant for his arrest.”); Foster v. Precision Auto. Brake Supply, No. B181348, 2006 
WL 306790, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2006) (“When [two defendants] did not show up 
[to their judgment debtor examinations], body attachments for their arrests were issued.”). 
 11. Some courts release debtors on noncash or recognizance bonds, which do not 
require the debtor to post any money. Other courts, however, use cash bonds. If a debtor 
cannot pay the full cash bond, she will be held in jail until her court date. See I Was Arrested 
and Have to Go to Court, ILLINOISLEGALAID.ORG, http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=5403 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). 
 12. “A payday loan is a small, short-term, triple-digit interest rate loan, typically in the 
range of $200 to $500 dollars, secured by the consumer’s postdated check or debit 
authorization.” Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday 
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010). Payday loans were originally 
designed to tide a consumer over until payday and be repaid in one lump sum when the 
consumer received her paycheck. In practice, however, a consumer is frequently unable to 
repay the loan so promptly. In these cases, the loan is converted into an interest-only loan that 
the consumer repays over a much longer period of time. Id. Payday loans are also known as 
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posted bond, which was subsequently turned over to the debt buyer 




Like Melanie, Steven Lipman had fallen on hard times. Steven 
was forced by his employer’s recession-related cutbacks into an early 
retirement two years ago. After fifteen years of service at his old 
company, Steven received a pension payment of $525 per month. 
Unable, however, to find a part-time job to supplement his income, 
Steven found that his monthly earnings did not cover his expenses, 
which forced Steven to deplete his savings and lean heavily on credit 
cards. One creditor who obtained a judgment against Steven served 
him personally with notice of an in personam debt collection action. 
Steven assumed an attorney would be too expensive, so he 
decided to go to court on his own. The courtroom was crowded and 
noisy—nothing at all like the solemn and majestic setting featured on 
television and in movies. Steven stood in a line of about ten other 
debtors, only a few of whom were represented,13 and checked in with 
the clerk. After about a twenty-minute wait, the creditor’s attorney 
called out Steven’s name and guided him into the hallway outside 
the courtroom, where five other debtor’s examinations were taking 
place.  
The creditor’s attorney asked Steven about what property he 
owned and the location of his bank account. Eventually, the attorney 
asked Steven how much money he could afford to pay each month. 
Steven felt flustered and was not sure what to say. Feeling 
embarrassed about having defaulted in the first place, Steven agreed 
that he could pay $80 per month until the debt was paid off.14  
 
“deferred presentment,” “cash advances,” “deferred deposits,” or “check loans.” ELIZABETH 
RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT § 7.5.5.2, at 342 (4th ed. 2009). 
 13. The vast majority of debtors who participate in in personam proceedings tend to be 
unrepresented. Telephone Interview with A. Kathleen Barauski, Esq., Norman H. Lehrer, P.C. 
(Dec. 15, 2010) (noting that only about five to ten percent of debtors have attorneys).  
 14. Depending on local practice, either the creditor’s attorney or the judge might 
conduct a debtor’s examination, which, according to legal aid attorneys, can impose significant 
pressure on debtors to agree to pay a certain amount of money every month in repayment of 
the debt. Telephone Interview with Larry Smith, Managing Attorney, Prairie State Legal 
Services (Sept. 29, 2010) (noting that many debtors who are the subjects of debtor’s 
examinations are unsophisticated, have never been to court previously, and feel pressure to 
enter into payment plans because, among other things, they want to “escape” the 
examinations). In an Indiana case subsequently overturned for violating Indiana’s prohibition 
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Steven, unfortunately, could not pay $80 per month. He was on 
a fixed income, and he counted pennies to try to make ends meet. 
The summons from the court was complex, and he had not noticed 
that it included examples of exempt property—various assets 
insulated from creditors’ collection efforts. The list included pension 
income, Social Security payments, a certain percentage of wage 
payments, veterans’ benefits, unemployment compensation, workers’ 
compensation, alimony and child support, and some personal 
property.15 Had Steven asserted his exemptions, he would not have 
had to forfeit any of his money or property.  
The creditor’s attorney did not tell him about the exemptions, 
and the judge never raised the issue.16 The judge incorporated the 
agreement in a court order. The order warned Steven that a failure 
 
against imprisonment for ordinary debts, the examination proceeded as follows:  
The Court: So we’re here today for you to explain what you’re going to do to pay 
this off.  
Mr. Button: I can’t.  
The Court: Okay, but you’re going to.  
Mr. Button: I can’t do it.  
The Court: Okay, Mr. Button.  
Mr. Button: Yes, Ma’am.  
The Court: For some reason we’re not communicating. Alright, you’re not hearing 
me for some reason. I am telling you that, yes, you will. You’re going to tell me how 
you’re going to go about doing that. And I’m not going to accept I cannot, and if 
the next words out of your mouth are I cannot, Mr. Button, then you’ll set [sic] 
with Mr. Glenn at the Sheriff’s Department until you find a way that, yes, you can. 
So what kind of payments can you make to pay this down?  
Mr. Button: Five dollars ($5.00) a month.  
The Court: Five dollars ($5.00) a month is—I’m going to be an old woman before 
this is ever paid off.  
Mr. Button: That’s what I can afford, Ma’am. I live on Social Security Disability. 
I’ve got to pay my rent and my lights and my gas.  
The Court: I’m going to order you pay twenty-five dollars ($25.00) a month until 
this is paid off. I’m going to show that we are to come back March 12, at 1 o’clock, 
at which time Miss James is going to tell me that she has already received fifty 
dollars ($50.00) towards this. Okay.  
Mr. Button: Yeah.  
The Court: Good luck to you, Mr. Button.  
Button v. James, 909 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
 15. See SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, app. F at 421–54 (summarizing each state’s 
exemption laws). 
 16. Unless debtors affirmatively assert their exemption rights, judges may feel 
uncomfortable raising the topic. Otherwise, judges may be perceived as serving as debtors’ 
advocates—not as disinterested adjudicators. Telephone Interview with the Hon. Paul M. 
Fullerton, Associate Judge, DuPage County, Illinois, 18th Judicial Circuit (Dec. 3, 2010). 
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to pay the monthly amount could result in a contempt of court 




Debtors as a whole repay the vast majority of their debts on time, 
without the need for creditors to resort to any collection activity.18 
When, however, debtors default, creditors (particularly unsecured 
creditors) must seek recourse expeditiously. Unlike secured creditors, 
who can foreclose on or repossess collateral in the event of a debtor’s 
default, unsecured creditors (from credit card companies to tort 
victims to veterinarians) operate without much of a net. Unsecured 
creditors lend to debtors on the strength of debtors’ repayment 
promises alone. If a debtor defaults on a debt owed to an unsecured 
creditor, the creditor—due to the relatively high cost of formal 
litigation—is likely to try to extract payment first through extralegal 
(nonlitigation) attempts, including dunning19 phone calls and 
letters.20 
If extralegal debt collection efforts prove unsuccessful, an 
unsecured creditor must enlist in state law’s “race of the diligent”21 
and compete against other unsecured creditors for a stake in the 
 
 17. In some states, it is legal for judges to exercise their contempt authority to imprison 
a “can-pay” debtor for failing to turn over money or property to a creditor. See Vt. Nat’l Bank 
v. Taylor, 445 A.2d 1122, 1124 (N.H. 1982). Other states, however, have concluded that this 
practice violates states’ prohibitions on imprisonment for debt. See In re Byrom, 316 S.W.3d 
787, 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (in habeas proceeding, holding unconstitutional a contempt 
order requiring independent executor of estate to pay $85,000 into court registry or be jailed 
for contempt).  
 18. MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 590 (5th ed. 2009) (“Most 
consumers pay their debts. Indeed, statistics reveal that only about two-to-three percent of the 
amount of credit extended to consumers becomes delinquent.”). 
 19. “Duns” refer to collectors’ preliminary contacts with consumers. See HOBBS, supra 
note 2, § 1.5.1, at 4. These include form letters and phone calls. Id. Dunning letters and calls 
tend to increase over time in severity of tone and expense to the collectors. Id.  
 20. See, e.g., DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE 
LAW § 12:1 (2008–2009 ed.). 
 21. State court collection law is considered a “race of the diligent” because unsecured 
creditors must rush to the courthouse, obtain a judgment, and then pursue collection remedies 
before other collectors exhaust the debtor’s assets. See NATHALIE MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, 
INSIDE BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 11 (2008). Creditors who come late to 
the scene risk collecting nothing. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE 
LAW OF DEBTORS & CREDITORS 99 (5th ed. 2006) (“The state collection system is based on 
the one-at-a-time race of the diligent that effectively pits every creditor against both the debtor 
and every other creditor who is trying to press the debtor for repayment.”). 
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debtor’s property. After obtaining a judgment against the debtor,22 
an unsecured creditor has two basic ways of attempting to satisfy its 
claim. Initially, the creditor may bring an in rem action 
(“execution”23) against the debtor. Alternatively (or, depending on 
state law,24 in addition to execution), the creditor may pursue an in 
personam remedy. 
In an in rem action—or “execution”—the judgment creditor, 
with the help of law enforcement officials (typically a sheriff), 
physically or constructively25 seizes the debtor’s unencumbered,26 
nonexempt27 property, sells it, and applies the sale proceeds to its 
judgment. In rem judgment enforcement is considered 
“cumbersome” and inefficient,28 since the creditor, lacking 
information about the debtor’s physical property, may not know 
where to look for the debtor’s assets.29  
 
 22. While a creditor must ordinarily obtain a judgment before making formal collection 
attempts, a creditor, in exceptional circumstances, may seek prejudgment attachment. STEVE 
H. NICKLES & DAVID G. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR: CREDITOR REMEDIES AND DEBTOR 
RIGHTS UNDER STATE AND NON-BANKRUPTCY FEDERAL LAW 222 (3d ed. 2009). 
 23. The term “execution” may generally describe any process that carries into effect a 
court’s judgment. JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 
9.02[C], at 9–8 (3d ed. 2011); Charles C. Kline, Collection Pursuant to Florida’s 
Supplementary Proceedings in Aid of Execution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 596, 598 (1971). In this 
context, however, “execution” refers to a creditor’s application for a writ of fieri facias, the 
ordinary writ used in the modern era to enforce a money judgment. See, e.g., NICKLES & 
EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 127.  
 24. See infra Part IV.B. 
 25. A sheriff may constructively or symbolically levy on property when, for example, the 
property is too bulky or cumbersome to seize physically. See, e.g., Gilbank v. Benton, 50 P.2d 
815, 817 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (authorizing constructive seizure of heavy machinery and 
equipment set in a concrete floor or embedded in brick). 
 26. “Unencumbered” property refers to property unburdened by a creditor’s security 
interest. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335–1338, 1666 (9th ed. 2009). 
 27. “Nonexempt” property refers to property that is not subject to any federal or state 
exemptions. State and federal exemptions “exclude a wide variety of income and property from 
seizure by creditors.” See, e.g., SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.2.1, at 239. A debtor, 
however, may voluntarily forfeit exempt property to a creditor. William C. Whitford, A 
Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 1047, 1055. 
 28. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.4, at 16 (2d ed. 1993).  
 29. See infra note 103 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM H. BROWN, THE LAW 
OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:56 (2010) (“[I]f the sheriff is unable easily to locate 
property, he will not normally serve as a detective for the judgment creditor.”); Whitford, 
supra note 27, at 1053 n.16 (“Most state statutes suggest that once a writ is delivered to a 
sheriff, the latter will search for leviable property. However, it is well known that today it is the 
creditor who must find the property and lead the sheriff to it.”). 
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At early common law, the legal system developed another 
method of debt collection, one that sought to eliminate various 
deficiencies30 in the in rem collection process. In personam debt 
collection remedies (variously known as “debtor’s examinations,” 
“turnover orders,” “citations to discover assets,” “supplementary 
proceedings,” “proceedings supplementary,” and “proceedings in aid 
of execution”)31 allow a creditor to shift much of the onus of 
collection to the debtor. A creditor utilizing in personam remedies 
can—in lieu of (or as a supplement to)32 seizing the debtor’s 
property—ask judges to summon debtors to court for various 
purposes that assist the creditor in debt collection. While in rem debt 
collection relies on a sheriff ’s physical seizure of nonexempt, 
unencumbered property, in personam debt collection methods force 
debtors to turn over money or property to creditors directly. Court 
orders are enforced through the court’s contempt authority,33 which 
judges generally exercise in this context through threats of 
imprisonment.34 In personam judgment collection is very popular 
with creditors, primarily because these remedies can be very 
effective.35 Indeed, collectors’ aggressive and frequent use of in 
personam remedies has caused some to liken the judgment 
enforcement system to a collection arm of creditors.36 
Primarily because the effectiveness of in personam debt collection 
relies on its enforcement mechanism—threats of depriving debtors of 
their liberty—debtors have sought protection from creditors’ 
collection efforts by invoking various constitutional law arguments. 
Some debtors have successfully argued that the exercise of a court’s 
contempt authority to enforce private debts is the functional 
 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 32. See infra Part IV.B. 
 33. DOBBS, supra note 28, at 16.  
 34. BROWN, supra note 29, § 6:58, at 6-218 (“The majority of states refuse to impose 
compensatory fines on the debtor who is in contempt . . . .”) (citing WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND 
& PIERRE R. LOISEAUX, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 107 (2d ed. 1979)).  
 35. See, e.g., Bradley J.B. Toben & Elizabeth A. Toben, Using Turnover Relief to Reach 
the Nonexempt Paycheck, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 195, 197 (1988) (“In destroying old conceptual 
barriers and readjusting the balance of debtor-creditor relations, the turnover statute [an 
example of an in personam remedy] is nothing short of an unmitigated boon for judgment 
creditors.”). 
 36. See Chris Serres & Glenn Howatt, In Jail for Being in Debt, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 6, 2010, at 1A. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:10 PM 
1509 Creditors’ Contempt 
 1519 
equivalent of imprisonment for debt default,37 which, with some 
significant caveats,38 is illegal in every state.39 In these cases, courts 
have ruled that since the state may not imprison a debtor for failing 
to pay a debt, a court likewise may not use its contempt authority to 
threaten to incarcerate a debtor for failing to turn over money or 
property to a creditor in an in personam debt collection action.40 
Academics and other commentators, moreover, have long argued 
that civil contemnors41 (like debtors imprisoned under the court’s 
contempt authority) are entitled to more substantial due process 
protections.42 In addition, beginning in the 1970s, many litigants 
have successfully argued that all debtors participating in 
postjudgment proceedings are entitled to meaningful procedural due 
process protections (including notice of their exemption rights).43 
A fundamental premise of modern debt collection law is that, 
although creditors are entitled to repayment, the exercise of excessive 
leverage by creditors over debtors can contribute to procedural and 
substantive unfairness as well as social dysfunction.44 These risks are 
acute in a competitive collection system that rewards speed and 
 
 37. See Carter v. Grace Whitney Props., 939 N.E.2d 630, 635–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that money judgments are generally enforced by execution, and that all forms of 
contempt are generally unavailable to enforce a money judgment); In re Byrom, 316 S.W.3d 
787, 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (same).  
 38. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.10, at 347 (describing that many state 
prohibitions on imprisonment for debt make an exception for fraud, tort, abscondment, 
enforcement of familial support obligations, and fines). See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“No 
person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.”). 
 39. See SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.10, at 346–47. Although the U.S. 
Constitution does not itself prohibit imprisonment for debt, BROWN, supra note 23, at 5–58, a 
federal statute provides that no federal court may imprison a person for debt in any state in 
which imprisonment for debt has been abolished. 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) (2006).  
 40. Carter, 939 N.E.2d at 635 (noting that because parties may enforce obligations to 
pay a fixed sum of money through execution, all forms of contempt are generally unavailable to 
enforce a monetary obligation); Byrom, 316 S.W.3d at 792 (in habeas proceeding, holding 
unconstitutional a contempt order requiring independent executor of estate to pay $85,000 
into court registry or be jailed for contempt). 
 41. The Supreme Court distinguishes between “criminal” and “civil” contempt. See, 
e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the 
Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1993). In a case of criminal 
contempt, the court will impose a punitive sanction like a fixed fine or jail sentence. Id. Civil 
contempt sanctions, in contrast, are imposed for coercive or compensatory reasons. Id.  
 42. See, e.g., id. at 1081–96; Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Examination of Debtor 
Incarceration in the Modern Age, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 391 (2006).  
 43. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.3.2, at 252–53. 
 44. See infra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. 
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aggressiveness, especially when a debtor’s assets are insufficient to 
cover all of her creditors’ claims. 
This Article argues that in spite of debtors’ meaningful successes 
in the constitutional law arena, the balance of power in the in 
personam debt collection context remains markedly and adversely 
skewed toward creditors. It examines several factors that contribute 
to this imbalance: (1) a dissonance between the “extraordinary”45 
coercive power of in personam debt collection and the ability of 
creditors in many states to institute these proceedings against 
undeniably ordinary debtors; (2) debtors’ passivity and failure to 
participate in the debt collection process generally; and (3) debtors’ 
lack of sophistication—a factor that contributes to pro se debtors’ 
failure to assert available exemptions. While some of these factors 
likewise complicate creditors’ exercise of other debt collection 
remedies, this Article focuses specifically on in personam actions, 
which—because of their potential threat to debtors’ liberty—trigger 
the most palpable physical, psychological, and coercive 
consequences.  
In an attempt to promote a more equitable balance between 
debtors’ and creditors’ rights—a balance more consistent with the 
normative goals of modern debt collection law—this Article 
recommends that legislators and policymakers adopt several changes 
to in personam debt collection. It suggests that (1) judges be 
required to review every in-court payment plan or out-of-court 
settlement and ensure that debtors are not forfeiting any exempt 
property unwittingly or involuntarily, and that (2) courts be 
prohibited from turning over to creditors bond money used to 
secure debtors’ attendance at contempt hearings—a common 
practice that likely violates states’ prohibitions on imprisonment for 
debt default. These proposals are necessary to curtail in personam 
proceedings’ in terrorem effects46—the externalities of a debt 
collection process gone awry. 
Debt collection—a critical feature of any market-based consumer 
credit system—is necessarily coercive: it relies on a system of credible 
threats to extract payments from debtors. The state has a significant 
 
 45. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Philip W. Tone & Arthur M. Martin, Historical and Practice 
Notes, in SMITH–HURD ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES, ch.110, ¶ 2–1402, 860, 864 
(1983).  
 46.  Throughout the Article, I explore how in personam debt collection actions, which 
conflate civil and criminal liability, can result in excessive coercion by creditors. 
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political, economic, and didactic interest in enforcing courts’ 
adjudications of private contract disputes. As Professor Lynn Lopucki 
has observed, unless a creditor’s judgment can be enforced, liability 
is “merely symbolic,”47 a status that risks undermining the legitimacy 
of the legal system and increasing the cost of credit. 
Currently, however, certain features of in personam proceedings 
raise significant normative concerns about how creditors use courts 
and law enforcement officials to enforce judgments. Because in 
personam proceedings involve the potential deployment of law 
enforcement, courts and policymakers must closely guard debtors’ 
due process rights and ensure that chronic disparities in 
sophistication levels between debtors and creditors do not 
unjustifiably affect the substantive outcome of collection disputes.  
This Article considers the power asymmetries between debtors 
and creditors in the in personam debt collection context and 
suggests ways to remedy defects in this system. This discussion is 
particularly timely, since insidious problems in the debt collection 
system—compounded by a weak economy and the recent entry of 
aggressive debt buyers—have yielded meaningful suggestions about 
ways to improve the debt collection process.48 As this Article 
explains, however, proposed reforms do not address a chronic 
imbalance in the leverage exercised by creditors over debtors during 
an in personam debt collection proceeding. This Article fills in that 
critical gap in the conversation.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II explores the origins of 
in personam debt collection actions and describes how these 
proceedings eliminated various defects in the traditional in rem 
collection remedy of execution. Part III describes how modern in 
personam remedies operate in practice and highlights several factors 
that contribute to asymmetry in bargaining power between debtors 
and creditors. Part IV describes how excessive creditor leverage in in 
personam debt collection actions—exacerbated by a problem I label 
as “contempt confusion”—contributes to harms that modern debt 
collection law seeks to curtail. This Part also describes current 
 
 47. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996) (“To hold a 
defendant liable is to enter a money judgment against the defendant. Unless that judgment can 
be enforced, liability is merely symbolic.”). 
 48. See, e.g., S. 3888, 111th Cong. (2010); FTC, supra note 5; Peter A. Holland, The 
One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in 
Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 272–85 (2011). 
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proposals to reform the debt collection system and observes that 
none of these proposals directly addresses clear problems with the 
operation of debtor’s examinations, supplementary proceedings, and 
other in personam proceedings. For this reason, I recommend two 
critical reforms to help establish a fairer bargaining relationship 
between debtors and creditors in in personam proceedings. Part V 
concludes. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO IN PERSONAM DEBT COLLECTION ACTIONS 
It is difficult to study the modern in personam debt collection 
system without analyzing its origins—an inquiry that yields 
meaningful insights about the intended goals of these proceedings. 
In this section, I discuss why in personam remedies were considered 
important innovations in the law of debt collection.  
A. The Common Law Predecessors of Modern In Personam Collection 
Actions: Creditors’ Bills 
Necessity has proven the mother of invention in the legal arena. 
In the area of creditors’ rights, the laws of debt collection have 
evolved throughout history to accommodate creditors’ interest in 
satisfying claims in the face of changing economies and evolving 
forms of wealth. 
At early common law, creditors’ primary remedy was execution,49 
a means by which creditors, through the use of various writs,50 could 
 
 49. 2 ABRAHAM CLARK FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXECUTIONS IN CIVIL 
CASES, AND OF PROCEEDINGS IN AID AND RESTRAINT THEREOF § 392, at 2144 (1888) (“The 
ordinary method for enforcing a judgment for money is by levy and sale of the property of the 
defendant.”). 
 50. These writs took one of four forms: elegit, capias ad satisfaciendum, fieri facias, and 
levari facias. A writ of elegit resulted in the transfer of the debtor’s personal property to his 
creditor at an appraised price. DAVID G. EPSTEIN & JONATHAN M. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 96 (1978). If the personal property was insufficient to 
satisfy the creditor’s judgment, the writ of elegit provided for the assignment to the creditor of 
one-half of the debtor’s land, which the creditor could use and enjoy (as a “tenant by elegit”) 
until the debt was satisfied. Id.; 3 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER 
AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 316 n.1 (1906); David Gray Carlson, Critique of 
Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1291, 
1304 n.46 (2008). Capias ad satisfaciendum (frequently abbreviated “ca sa”) required the 
local sheriff to arrest a judgment debtor and keep him imprisoned until the debt was paid. 
EPSTEIN & LANDERS, supra. The writ of fieri facias (or “fi fa”) allowed the creditor to seize 
and sell tangible personal property. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS: 
TEACHING MATERIALS 152 (1973). The writ of levari facias allowed the creditor to collect 
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satisfy judgments by pursuing debtors’ physical assets. In a rural 
community, execution—an in rem remedy—largely satisfied 
creditors’ needs, since the debtor’s wealth, consisting primarily of 
real estate and chattels, was tangible and transparent.51  
As debtors (including corporate debtors52) began to possess 
more intangible assets, however, execution writs frequently proved 
inadequate in satisfying creditors’ claims.53 Execution writs were 
issued by courts of law,54 which did not have the authority to reach 
intangible property or a debtor’s equitable interests in property (e.g., 
stock certificates, insurance policies, or debts owed to the debtor).55 
In response to creditors’ need to reach new forms of property, 
chancery courts (courts of equity) developed an “equitable 
counterpart” to execution: the creditor’s bill.56 A creditor who was 
unable to satisfy his judgment through execution could file a 
separate action in a chancery court requesting, among other things, 
that the debtor turn over his equitable assets to the creditor.57 The 
assets were subsequently sold, and the proceeds were used to help 
satisfy the creditor’s judgment.58  
The creditor’s bill also served many auxiliary functions that 
helped creditors enforce their judgments. A creditor’s bill could be 
used for discovery. The judgment creditor, for example, could 
examine the debtor and third parties in an attempt to locate assets.59 
To thwart debtors’ attempts to fraudulently convey property to 
friends or family, a creditor could request an injunction prohibiting a 
 
rents from the debtor’s property or seize the property itself. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Isadore H. Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments in New York: 
Supplementary Proceedings, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1935) (describing the proceeds 
of execution sales as likely sufficient to satisfy the “great part of money judgments . . . in a rural 
or semi-rural community where everyone was acquainted with the affairs of everyone else”).  
 52. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law—A 
Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155, 178 (1957). 
 53. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & LANDERS, supra note 50, at 108. 
 54. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 50, at 152. 
 55. See, e.g., Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528, 531–32 (holding that a copyright, which 
has no corporeal, tangible existence, cannot be seized via execution); Doreen J. Gridley, The 
Immunity of Intangible Assets From a Writ of Execution: Must We Forgive Our Debtors?, 28 
IND. L. REV. 755, 758–61 (1994); Riesenfeld, supra note 52, at 178. 
 56. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 50, at 153. The creditor’s bill was also known as a 
creditor’s suit. Id.  
 57. E.g., id. 
 58. E.g., id.  
 59. E.g., id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1524 
debtor from disposing of or encumbering property.60 To prevent 
dissipation of value or to facilitate collection efforts, a creditor could 
apply for the appointment of a receiver, who could collect the 
debtor’s money and manage the debtor’s property.61 
Although they helped creditors reach intangible assets and 
equitable interests, creditors’ bills were inefficient collection tools.62 
Before the merger of law and equity, a creditor interested in using a 
creditor’s bill had to bring two separate actions: the first, in a court 
of law, and the second, in a court of equity.63  
Initially, a creditor had to obtain a judgment in a court of law 
and attempt to satisfy the judgment through execution.64 If the 
execution writ was returned nulla bona (indicating that the debtor 
had insufficient tangible assets to satisfy the judgment or that 
sufficient assets could not be located), a creditor could progress to 
the next step by applying for a creditor’s bill in a court of equity.65 
Bringing two actions was expensive and time-consuming.66 Even 
if a creditor knew, for example, that the debtor had no executable 
property, a creditor would first have to obtain a judgment in a court 
of law and attempt execution.67  
In a partial attempt to streamline this process, as part of the 
merger of law and equity, states in the mid-nineteenth century 
enacted in personam remedies (frequently referred to as 
“supplementary proceedings”).68 Following the adoption of these 
 
 60. E.g., id. 
 61. See, e.g., id. 
 62. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 51, at 1013 (noting that although the creditor’s bill was 
“available to almost every judgment creditor,” the remedy “involved him in Jarndyce’s 
disease.” “Jarndyce” refers to an interminable fictional court case in Chancery in Charles 
Dickens’ Bleak House.). 
 63. Walter H. Moses, Enforcement of Judgments Against Hidden Assets, 1951 U. ILL. 
L.F. 73, 75 (“[T]he creditors’ bill has one very serious disadvantage; it is a suit separate and 
distinct from the one in which the judgment was obtained, with all the expense and delay 
which that entails.”). 
 64. See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN, JONATHAN M. LANDERS & STEVE H. NICKLES, 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 58–59 (3d ed. 1987). 
 65. See, e.g., id. 
 66. Moses, supra note 63, at 75. 
 67. See, e.g., Riesenfeld, supra note 52, at 179–81; Gridley, supra note 55, at 763–64 
(describing as an unjust “waiting period” the requirement that a judgment creditor seeking to 
reach a judgment debtor’s intangible property must first attempt to satisfy the judgment 
through a writ of execution). 
 68. Riesenfeld, supra note 52, at 180–81 (citing N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. Reported 
Completed, § 853 ff (1850); IOWA CODE § 1953 ff (1851); IOWA CODE § 3391 ff (1860)). 
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statutes, a judgment creditor interested in attaching the debtor’s 
intangible assets or equitable interests no longer had to bring two 
separate actions—one at law and the other, at equity.69 Instead, after 
recovering a judgment and attempting execution, the creditor could 
then apply to the same court for (1) a subpoena directing the debtor 
to appear and answer questions about his assets and their location, 
(2) an injunction prohibiting the transfer of the debtor’s assets, 
and/or (3) an order instructing the debtor to turn over to the 
creditor one or more intangible assets or equitable interests.70  
B. The Risk of Imprisonment in In Personam Actions 
While creditors’ bills and in personam remedies were necessary 
innovations in the law of debt collection, they differ dramatically 
from writs of execution, creditors’ traditional means of collection. 
Execution is an in rem remedy: it involves the physical or 
constructive seizure of property,71 which is subsequently sold to help 
satisfy the creditor’s judgment.72  
In rem enforcement of judgments has been described as 
inefficient and cumbersome,73 since (1) the state must notify the 
debtor, (2) an execution sale must meet specific procedural 
requirements, (3) buyers will generally not pay full price unless it is 
clear that they can receive unencumbered title, and (4) issues of 
priority among several judgment creditors can complicate and delay 
the distribution of proceeds.74 A debtor cannot “disobey” an in rem 
command, which does not direct the debtor to do anything.75 
While similar complications arise in in personam cases,76 in 
personam remedies partially alleviate the creditor’s burden by forcing 
the debtor to play a meaningful role in the debt collection process. 
In personam remedies require a debtor to appear in court, share 
 
 69. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 60 (citing Mitchell v. Godsey, 53 N.E.2d 
150, 154 (Ind. 1944) for the proposition that supplemental proceedings are “a continuation of 
the creditor’s original action against the debtor”). 
 70. BROWN, supra note 29, § 6:58. 
 71. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 72. DOBBS, supra note 28, § 1.4, at 15.  
 73. Id. at 16. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Satrap, 302 A.D.2d 381, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (holding 
that the lower court had to first resolve whether debtor’s wife had interest in the car before the 
debtor’s car could be turned over to a creditor).  
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copies of certain documents with the creditor,77 answer questions 
about the location of assets, and turn over nonexempt property 
directly to creditors.78 
 A debtor summoned to participate in an in personam 
proceeding, a remedy that functions as a combination of discovery 
and collection, may face contempt sanctions—and the possibility of 
imprisonment—for one of two basic reasons: (1) failure to pay a 
creditor or turn over property to a creditor (which I will refer to as 
“nonpayment contempt”), a sanction associated with the collection 
feature of in personam proceedings, or (2) failure to appear in court 
or otherwise supply information to the court and/or creditor (which 
I will refer to as “nonappearance contempt”), a sanction associated 
with the discovery feature of in personam remedies. In either case, if 
a court concludes that a debtor is capable of compliance (i.e., capable 
of paying the creditor or supplying certain information to the 
creditor), the debtor can be held in civil contempt.79 As a civil 
contemnor who “holds the key” to her own jail cell,80 the debtor 
may be fined81 or imprisoned until she complies with the court’s 
directive.82 A debtor can purge herself of nonappearance contempt 
by physically appearing at the courthouse and truthfully answering 
 
 77. A creditor may ask the debtor to bring certain documents to the in personam 
proceeding, including, for example, paycheck stubs, bank statements, tax returns, and 
automobile insurance cards. See, e.g., JAMES W. ACKERMAN & GREGORY P. SGRO, HOW TO 
GET RESULTS IN COLLECTION OF DELINQUENT DEBTS IN ILLINOIS 47 (1997).  
 78. As I later discuss, however, the coercive qualities of in personam proceedings put 
pressure on debtors to sacrifice exempt assets to creditors. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 79. In any contempt action, a person may not be imprisoned or sanctioned if she is 
incapable of complying with the court order. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 
(1983) (“In a civil contempt proceeding such as this, of course, a defendant may assert a 
present inability to comply with the order in question . . . . Where compliance is impossible, 
neither the moving party nor the court has any reason to proceed with the civil contempt 
action.”) (citations and emphasis omitted); George v. Beard, 824 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2003) (“Before an offender can be confined solely for nonpayment of financial obligations 
he or she must be given an opportunity to establish inability to pay.”). 
 80. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (explaining that civil contemnors 
“carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets”). 
 81. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) 
(subjecting judgment debtor who failed to comply with turnover order to a $500-per-day fine 
and period of incarceration). But see DOBBS, supra note 28, at 13–14 (explaining that most 
states refuse to impose compensatory fines on a debtor who is in contempt). 
 82. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 613 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e cannot 
disturb the state courts’ decision that there is no federal constitutional bar to Mr. Chadwick’s 
indefinite confinement for civil contempt so long as he retains the ability to comply with the 
order requiring him to pay over the money at issue.”). 
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questions about her assets and their location. In contrast, a debtor 
can purge herself of nonpayment contempt only by turning over 
specific money or property to a creditor. 
Whether law enforcement officials actually arrest debtors for 
failing to comply with either type of directive depends on factors that 
vary significantly from state to state, and even from county to 
county. The law of the state, local practices,83 creditor policies,84 
attorney aggressiveness,85 and a judge’s predilections86 can all 
potentially affect whether or not the court issues a body attachment 
writ, and whether or not police officers will arrest the debtor.  
Any effective debt collection technique relies on coercion: the 
ability of a creditor to make credible threats to extract payment from 
debtors. The “extraordinary” nature of in personam debt collection, 
however, derives from its enforcement mechanism. Courts presiding 
over in personam actions compel debtors to show up in court and 
provide information about their assets87 or to turn over money or 
property to creditors by threatening to deprive debtors of their 
liberty. Because debtors’ freedom is at stake, constitutional law has 
long served as the primary source of debtor-protection efforts in the 
in personam collection context.88 
Because in personam remedies trigger the potential deployment 
of law enforcement, their contours must be closely patrolled. This 
coercive function gives an in personam remedy its teeth, and is part 
of the remedy’s appeal to creditors.89 For as long as in personam 
remedies have existed, however, commentators have described this 
shift in bargaining power as potentially problematic, a topic this 
Article explores in the following section. 
 
 83. Telephone Interview with Beverly Yang, Staff Attorney, Land of Lincoln Legal 
Assistance Found. (Oct. 5, 2010). 
 84. Lucette Lagnado, Medical Seizures: Hospitals Try Extreme Measures to Collect Their 
Overdue Debts: Patients Who Skip Hearings on Bills are Arrested; It’s a ‘Body Attachment,’ 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at A1. 
 85. Yang, supra note 83. 
 86. Lagnado, supra note 84, at A1.  
 87. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 550.011 (2009). 
 88. See supra Part I. 
 89. See, e.g., Toben & Toben, supra note 35, at 197. 
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III. FACTORS COMPLICATING IN PERSONAM DEBT COLLECTION  
A. In Personam Debt Collection as an “Extraordinary” Remedy 
An in personam remedy—coupled with the threat of 
enforcement through the court’s contempt authority—may be the 
only recourse a creditor has against a debtor who is able to pay a 
judgment but refuses to do so. A creditor may use a debtor’s 
examination or a turnover order against a debtor for important and 
legitimate reasons: to uncover the location of intangible assets, or to 
force a recalcitrant debtor to forfeit assets, using the judge’s 
contempt authority as a critical nuclear option. O.J. Simpson,90 
familial support obligors,91 and fraud defendants92 have all been the 
subjects of in personam debt collection actions.  
Creditors and commentators have long acknowledged, however, 
that in personam debt collection actions—proceedings that utilize 
the state’s power of imprisonment to help enforce private debts—are 
inherently coercive. In 1886, an author of a treatise on 
supplementary proceedings remarked that creditors “often resorted 
to [these remedies] where it is evident that the judgment debtor has 
no property, but merely as an experiment to try to frighten or harass 
him to pay something on the judgment or otherwise.”93 More 
recently, Illinois attorneys described citations to discover assets as an 
“extraordinary remedy” that should not be used as a “club to . . . 
bludgeon a judgment debtor into settlement of judgments or 
decrees which he is without property to pay,” nor “used to deal with 
assets which are known to the judgment creditor and can be reached 
by ordinary means of enforcing a judgment.”94 Elizabeth Toben and 
Professor Bradley Toben have observed that in personam remedies 
have “readjust[ed] the balance of debtor-creditor relations,” 
 
 90. Simpson Must Turn Over Heisman, $500,000 in Valuables, CNN.COM (March 27, 
1997), http://edition.cnn.com/US/9703/27/simpson.order/index.html. 
 91. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pope-Clifton, 823 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(following civil contempt finding against husband for failure to pay child support, divorced 
wife filed citation to discover assets, resulting in freezing of husband’s credit union assets). 
 92. See, e.g., Ohi-Rail v. Barnett, No. 09-JE-18, 2010 WL 1328524, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 93. DANIEL S. RIDDLE & E. FITCH BULLARD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN 
PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO EXECUTION, at v (3d ed. 1886).  
 94. Jenner et. al, supra note 45, § 2-1402. 
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resulting in “nothing short of an unmitigated boon for judgment 
creditors.”95  
In the sections that follow, this Article discusses specific debtor 
behaviors and characteristics of modern in personam proceedings 
that increase the risk of excessive creditor leverage: (1) The ability of 
creditors in many states to institute in personam actions against any 
debtor, regardless of her ability to satisfy the judgment; (2) the high 
volume and informality of these proceedings; and (3) debtors’ 
passivity, debtors’ lack of sophistication, and lapses in key procedural 
protections, including, for example, the failure of courts to 
adequately inform debtors about their exemption rights.  
Many of these problems—including threats to exempt property, 
the informality of debt collection procedures, and debtor passivity—
are present in other areas of debt collection.96 These manifestations 
of weaknesses in debtor protections undoubtedly merit independent 
scrutiny. This Article focuses specifically on in personam 
proceedings, however, since the more general problems complicating 
many debt collection actions—coupled with specific problems in the 
laws and procedures governing in personam actions—raise the stakes 
for in personam debtors in a singular way. Because in personam 
proceedings threaten debtors’ liberty, defects in debtor protections 
in this area trigger particularly dire and palpable harms.  
B. An “Extraordinary” Remedy and Its Extraordinarily Ordinary Use 
Against Debtors 
State laws governing in personam remedies fall into two general 
categories: (1) those that require judgment creditors97 to 
unsuccessfully attempt execution before pursuing in personam 
 
 95. See, e.g., Toben & Toben, supra note 35, at 197. 
 96. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part Two: Liens On New 
York Personal Property, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43, 134–35 (2009) (describing New York law 
that insulates from liability banks that allow creditors to garnish accounts containing exempt 
funds); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims In Arbitration and In 
Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 98–99 (2011) (describing in debt-collection arbitration 
study the strong relationship between a debtor’s failure to appear and the creditor-claimant’s 
likelihood of winning). 
 97. The term “judgment creditor” refers to a creditor who has successfully sued and 
recovered a judgment against a debtor (now a “judgment debtor”). Letter from the Federal 
Trade Commission to Senator Al Franken 4 (Aug. 16, 2010), [hereinafter FTC-Franken 
Letter], available at http://caveatemptorblog.com/wp-content/uploads/FTC-Response-to-
Sen-Franken-2010.08.16.pdf. 
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actions (“in rem states”)98 and (2) those that allow creditors to 
pursue in personam debt collection actions immediately after 
obtaining the judgment (“in personam states”).99 For example, a 
judgment creditor in an in rem state must first ask the sheriff to 
attempt a levy on the debtor’s property (e.g., a car) before the 
creditor may summon the debtor to court to answer questions about 
her income and assets in an in personam proceeding. In contrast, 
after an unsecured creditor in an in personam state recovers a 
judgment, that creditor may proceed immediately to the use of a 
debtor’s examination or other in personam action.  
The requirement in in rem states that creditors first attempt 
execution before instituting in personam proceedings was not—at 
least originally—predicated on consumer protection principles. 
Rather, this prerequisite is a vestige of the historic division between 
law and equity.100 Before the merger of law and equity, a creditor 
would have to exhaust legal remedies (like execution) before seeking 
equitable relief (including in personam actions).101  
Although this prerequisite is inefficient from the creditor’s 
perspective, this inefficiency provides some indirect protection to 
debtors. If a creditor must first expend time and resources in an 
unsatisfied execution, that creditor, absent a reasonably high 
likelihood of payment, is more likely to abandon its collection 
efforts.  
Professor William Whitford and others have criticized in rem 
states’ prerequisite of an unsatisfied execution as illogical and 
inefficient.102 Under this view, all states should permit creditors to 
 
 98. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-55-8-1 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 575.02 (2010); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 513.380 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498:8 (2011); OHIO R. CIV. P. 69; Dan B. 
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 273 (1971) (“Statutes in 
several states forbid the use of contempt imprisonments to enforce money judgments that can 
be enforced in other ways.”).  
 99. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1402 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.6,104 (2010). Texas’s turnover statute is a cross between these two general categories. 
Under the Texas statute, a creditor cannot seek the turnover of property that can be readily 
attached or levied on by ordinary legal process, but the creditor need not have actually 
unsuccessfully attempted execution before seeking turnover of a debtor’s assets. See TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (West 2008). 
 100. Alfred F. Conard, An Appraisal of Illinois Law on the Enforcement of Judgments, 
1951 U. ILL. L.F. 96, 108–10. 
 101. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Conard, supra note 100, at 108; Whitford, supra note 27, at 1096–97 
(describing the prerequisite of an unsatisfied execution as “an unnecessary costly technicality”). 
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seek in personam remedies independent of execution, since 
proceedings like debtor’s examinations allow creditors to determine 
whether debtors, in fact, possess any leviable property. Presumably, 
debtors are the best source of information about their assets, and it 
makes sense to summon them to court to determine what property 
they own and where that property is located. If a creditor has 
insufficient knowledge about the debtor’s money and property, 
execution may be a waste of time and resources, since creditors may 
not know whether it is worth it to attempt execution in the first 
place, or to which assets to direct the sheriff.103  
By contrast, in an in personam state, where creditors can initiate 
proceedings like debtor’s examinations immediately after obtaining a 
judgment against the debtor.104 In these states, after a consumer 
defaults, many creditors (either original creditors or debt buyers) sue 
debtors on the underlying debt, recover judgments, and institute in 
personam proceedings without first determining whether or not the 
debtor has sufficient nonexempt assets to satisfy a potential 
judgment.105 This strategy makes sense, given creditors’ incentives at 
state law, which, depending upon the size of the lawsuit and the 
costs of legal process, favor speed over precision.  
To maximize its chances of a recovery in state law’s “race of the 
diligent,”106 an unsecured creditor must rush to obtain a judgment 
and to perfect its lien against the debtor’s property.107 The 
institution of an in personam action is a quick and relatively 
convenient way for a creditor to stake its claim.108 Generally, the 
 
 103. Whitford, supra note 27, at 1097 (“[T]he requirement is a purposeless technicality, 
since a sheriff will not levy under a writ unless the creditor directs him to property subject to 
execution”); see also Donna Brown, Post Judgment Remedies Tips for Litigators from a 
Creditors’ Rights Attorney, 32 THE ADVOC. (Texas) 63, 64 (2005) (noting that sheriffs 
“appreciate receiving as much information on the judgment debtor as possible to assist them in 
the levy”).  
 104. See sources cited supra note 99. 
 105. Telephone Interview with Alan Alop, Deputy Dir., Legal Assistance Found. of 
Metro. Chi. (Dec. 2, 2010); Interview with Sarah Grincewicz, Esq., The Albert Law Firm, in 
Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 7, 2010); cf. HOBBS, supra note 2, § 1.4.3, at 4 (stating that while a debt 
collector’s reasonable objective is to target the relatively few delinquent consumers who can 
afford to repay their debts, some collectors aggressively pursue poor debtors). 
 106. See sources cited supra note 21. 
 107. Whitford, supra note 27, at 1066–67 (describing how state law priority rules 
encourage unsecured creditors, faced with an insolvent or potentially insolvent debtor, to 
resort to coercive execution more quickly than would be necessary if the rules did not favor the 
creditor who first obtains a lien in the debtor’s property). 
 108. In Illinois, for example, a lien created through service of a citation to discover assets 
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service of the summons to participate in an in personam debt 
collection action creates a lien on the debtor’s nonexempt personal 
property and enjoins the debtor from disposing of it.109  
Somewhat paradoxically, it can be economical for creditors 
(particularly debt buyers, whose profit model relies on a fast, high-
volume collection process)110 to move quickly without taking the 
time to evaluate their chances of repayment. Delay in collection can 
result in increased litigation costs. In addition, delay can reduce a 
creditor’s prospects of successful collection, since a debtor might 
experience further financial setbacks, leave the jurisdiction and more 
easily dodge creditor communications, declare bankruptcy,111 or 
waste or transfer nonexempt assets.112  
Since the debtor’s examination functions as an independent 
discovery device, creditors often initiate in personam proceedings 
without considering a specific debtor’s ability to satisfy the 
judgment.113 Suing an insolvent debtor may be cheaper than 
determining whether she is truly incapable of repaying her 
creditor.114 Moreover, even if creditors wanted to initiate a 
potentially time-consuming prejudgment discovery process, they 
generally could not do so in small claims cases.115 
 
expires in six months, giving the creditor a relatively long period of time within which to 
enforce the lien. See 4A BARRY LEVENSTAM ET AL., ILL. CIV. LITIG. GUIDE § 6:11 (2009 ed.). 
 109. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1402(m) (West 2010).  
 110. See Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt 
Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 726 (2006) (noting how the emergence of 
the modern debt-buying industry has coincided with the ability of firms to purchase large 
portfolios of debt and then to fully exploit their technology and personnel to reach thousands 
of debtors each day). 
 111. Because of the risk that the bankruptcy trustee will avoid preferential payments, 11 
U.S.C. § 547 (2006), a creditor has an interest in seeing at least 90 days elapse between the 
debtor’s payment to that creditor and the date of the bankruptcy petition.  
 112. Whitford, supra note 27, at 1062. 
 113. Barauski, supra note 13. 
 114. Whitford, supra note 27, at 1061 n.51 (“It is not costless to a creditor to determine 
whether a debtor is a ‘won’t pay’ or a ‘can’t pay,’ and as a consequence creditors will 
sometimes fruitlessly harass or sue a ‘can’t pay’ because it is cheaper than determining the 
debtor’s true status.”). 
 115. See, e.g., IND. RULES CT., SMALL CL. 6, available at http://www.in.gov/ 
judiciary/rules/small_claims/index.html (“Discovery may be had in a manner generally 
pursuant to the rules governing any other civil action, but only upon the approval of the court 
and under such limitations as may be specified. The court should grant discovery only upon 
notice and good cause shown and should limit such action to the necessities of the case.”). 
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Collection lawyers also know that securing a judgment is 
relatively easy116 and inexpensive, particularly because the vast 
majority of debt collection actions result in default judgments.117 The 
late Professor Caplovitz described the initiation of a lawsuit as a 
riskless proposition for creditors, since “the creditor almost invariably 
wins, mainly because the debtor fails to show up.”118 One legal aid 
attorney posits that debt collection attorneys’ financial incentives 
(i.e., their interest in maximizing litigation revenue by bringing 
collection actions) may explain why many debtors with only exempt 
assets find themselves the subjects of in personam proceedings.119  
Creditors’ incentives to sue debtors and institute in personam 
actions without first evaluating the likelihood of repayment 
inevitably result in some imprecision: debt collectors will invariably 
target some poor, unsophisticated, and/or judgment-proof 
debtors.120 From the debtor’s perspective, this can be problematic, 
since debtors are often ill-prepared to respond to the initiation of in 
personam actions.  
In addition, in spite of the severity of the sanction that gives an 
in personam action its teeth, in personam remedies are often initiated 
and executed on a high-volume basis and with a striking degree of 
informality. For example, in an extremely busy post-judgment 
courtroom,121 which, according to one estimate, issues over 40,000 
body attachments a year,122 debtor’s examinations are conducted 
outside of the judge’s presence123 and are not memorialized through 
court reporting. Many—if not most—debtors are unrepresented,124 
and creditors’ attorneys have no obligation to inform debtors of their 
 
 116. Interview with John N. Dore, Esq., in Chi., Ill. (Nov. 17, 2010). 
 117. FTC, supra note 5, at 7. 
 118. David Caplovitz, The Husk of Puff and the Kernel of Truth: A Critique of Injury, 
Ignorance, and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 672, 675 
(1972). 
 119. Yang, supra note 83. 
 120. A judgment-proof debtor is one with no nonexempt or unencumbered assets. 
Whitford, supra note 27, at 1055.  
 121. According to various attorneys at the CARPLS Self-Help Collection Desk, the First 
District Municipal Department of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois is the busiest 
postjudgment courtroom in the country.  
 122. Interview with Clerk, First Dist. Mun. Dep’t of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty., 
Ill., in Chi., Ill. (Jan. 7, 2010).  
 123. Creditors’ attorneys conduct the debtor’s examinations in the hallway outside of the 
courtroom. 
 124. See Barauski, supra note 13. 
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exemption rights.125 This combination of factors raises serious 
concerns about the adjudicative fairness of the in personam debt 
collection process. 
C. Predictable Lapses in Debtors’ Behavior 
1. Showing up is half the battle: How debtors’ absence raises the stakes 
One of the most intractable problems in debt collection is the 
debtor’s failure to participate in the legal process. Many debtors are 
absent at every stage of debt collection, ranging from actions on the 
debt (which in as many as sixty to ninety-five percent of cases result 
in a default judgment126) to collection actions like debtor’s 
examinations.127 
Why exactly debtors fail to participate in the debt collection 
process is a subject of debate and empirical uncertainty.128 Consumer 
advocates cite as likely causes various factors largely outside of the 
debtor’s control: sewer service,129 the incomprehensibility of 
communications from the court, debtors’ trepidation about the legal 
system, lack of access to legal representation, work and family 
constraints, and a lack of transportation.130 Creditors, in contrast, 
argue that debtors’ absence is, in effect, an implicit admission of 
liability.131 Under this view, debtors choose not to participate in the 
process after concluding that defending against an action on a valid 
debt (or otherwise participating in the collection process) would be 
futile.132 
A debtor’s failure to participate in an action on her defaulted 
debt is problematic, since the debtor forfeits an opportunity to raise 
significant defenses like the expiration of the statute of limitations.133 
The consequences of a failure to participate in an in personam 
proceeding, however, can be even more severe. While creditors 
 
 125. Fullerton, supra note 16. 
 126. See, e.g., FTC, supra note 5. 
 127. Some estimate that debtors show up to in personam debt collection actions about 
fifty percent of the time. Caplovitz, supra note 118, at 675–76.  
 128. FTC, supra note 5. 
 129. Sewer service occurs when a process server fails to serve the consumer but falsely 
asserts that he has successfully done so. FTC, supra note 5, at 8 n.22.  
 130. Id. at 7, 12.  
 131. Id. at 7. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at iii. 
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benefit from the ability to combine discovery and collection in one in 
personam action, this combination can dramatically increase the 
coerciveness of these proceedings. If a debtor fails to show up at a 
debtor’s examination and the court issues a rule to show cause,134 the 
debtor may eventually be arrested or asked to surrender herself135 to 
local law enforcement authorities.136 Based on debtors’ track record 
of passivity in the debt collection process,137 creditors can anticipate 
that many debtors will fail to show up to court and that judges will 
issue many body attachments or bench warrants against absentee 
debtors.  
Once a debtor is threatened with imprisonment or is actually 
arrested, her leverage drops markedly. Although a body attachment 
issued against a “no-show” debtor is an attempt to coerce 
compliance with the discovery feature of in personam proceedings, a 
debtor may interpret this sanction as punishment for her failure to 
pay a debt.138  
Notwithstanding any possible defenses to the underlying debt, a 
debtor facing imprisonment is more likely to feel pressure to settle 
with the creditor or post bond through any available means: for 
example, by turning over exempt property,139 taking out a payday 
loan or cash advance on her credit card,140 or borrowing money from 
friends or family. As the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
acknowledged, judgment debtors arrested for nonappearance “may 
be willing to pay the bail (and indirectly the judgment) using assets 
(such as Social Security payments) the law prohibits creditors from 
garnishing or otherwise obtaining to satisfy a judgment.”141 
 
 134. A rule to show cause (also known as a “show-cause” order or an “order to show 
cause”) is a document instructing the debtor to appear in court and explain why she should 
not be held in contempt. 
 135. Caplovitz, supra note 118 (explaining that debtors usually surrender themselves 
voluntarily to law enforcement officials). 
 136. Whether or not law enforcement officials actually arrest debtors for lack of 
compliance depends on factors that vary significantly from state to state, and even from county 
to county. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.  
 137. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 138. I refer to this problem as “contempt confusion.” See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 139. FTC-Franken letter, supra note 97, at 6.  
 140. See, e.g., Body Attachment, FREEADVICE LEGAL FORUM (Mar. 19, 2009 8:36 AM), 
http://forum.freeadvice.com/civil-litigation-46/body-attachment-459501.html (Maryland 
debtor who had been served with body attachment order indicated that debtor planned to take 
out payday loan to cover $500 bond). 
 141. FTC-Franken letter, supra note 97, at 6. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1536 
The legal system must allocate parties’ rights as efficiently as 
possible, a reality a consumer must acknowledge at the moment she 
borrows money and assumes the risk that she will default on her 
obligations. Provided debtors are properly served,142 one might argue 
that debtors who opt out of the legal process by failing to respond to 
court orders to participate in in personam proceedings voluntarily 
forfeit an opportunity to assert their defenses and their bargaining 
power.  
Debtors’ failure to participate at the judgment and collection 
stages, however, may be partially explained by the ease with which 
one can fall into the role of a passive debtor. Debtors face a barrage 
of letters and calls from debt collectors for months or even years, 
and—particularly when a debtor is unable to pay—a debtor may 
understandably want to cut off all contact with her creditors (perhaps 
by screening her phone calls or even by changing her phone number 
or address). Once lawsuits begin—and even when debtors receive 
summonses from the court to participate in in personam actions—a 
debtor may not easily overcome her inertia and, in some cases, a 
degree of learned helplessness.  
2. Debtors’ unfamiliarity with exemptions 
While consumers are a heterogeneous group, many, if not most, 
exhibit a striking lack of financial sophistication. Many consumer 
borrowers, for example, are unfamiliar with important borrowing 
terms, including the true cost of credit.143 In the area of debt 
collection, debtors’ lack of sophistication is reflected, among other 
things, in their unfamiliarity with their state and federal exemption 
rights.144 
Exemption laws, which vary significantly from state to state, 
protect specific amounts of certain categories of property from 
creditors’ collection efforts. For example, federal and state exemption 
 
 142. Consumer advocates contend, however, that improper service, or “sewer service,” 
may contribute to consumers’ absence from debt collection actions. See supra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
 143. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–
13 n.18 (2008). 
 144. Attorneys who represent both creditors and debtors, as well as judges, acknowledge 
that debtors largely seem unfamiliar with their exemption rights. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 83; 
Alop, supra note 105; Barauski, supra note 13; Interview with Ashley B. Highland, Supervising 
Attorney, CARPLS (Jan. 7, 2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:10 PM 
1509 Creditors’ Contempt 
 1537 
laws generally insulate Social Security payments, retirement accounts, 
some wages, veterans’ benefits, unemployment compensation, 
workers’ compensation, alimony and child support, and some 
personal property.145 Courts have articulated exemption statutes’ 
broad and fundamental public policy goals: “(1) to provide the 
debtor with enough money to survive; (2) to protect the debtor’s 
dignity; (3) to afford a means of financial rehabilitation; (4) to 
protect the family unit from impoverishment; and (5) to spread the 
burden of a debtor’s support from society to his creditors.”146 
In spite of compelling policy justifications for the protection of 
exempt property, it is easy for a debtor—either voluntarily or 
unwittingly—to forfeit exempt property to a creditor. Even when a 
debtor is judgment-proof, the debtor is not without assets; rather, a 
judgment-proof debtor’s assets are exempt or encumbered.147 
“Nothing in the exemption laws . . . prevents the debtor from 
making a voluntary payment from otherwise exempt assets.”148 
Moreover, although a creditor has no property interest in a 
debtor’s exempt property,149 a debtor’s right to exempt property is 
not necessarily “self-executing.”150 In other words, the debtor must 
generally affirmatively assert her exemption rights, which requires the 
debtor to have (1) received notice of her exemption rights (or 
learned about them through other means, as from an attorney151), 
and (2) understood those rights and how to assert them. Because 
debtors must affirmatively claim certain property as exempt, and 
exemption laws do not prohibit debtors from making “voluntary” 
payments to creditors out of exempt property, it may make financial 
sense for collectors to seek payment from even the poorest of 
debtors.  
While exempt assets are thus always vulnerable to creditor 
collection efforts, the subjects of in personam proceedings may be 
 
 145. See SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, app. F at 421–54. 
 146. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, at 239. But see William T. Vukowich, Debtors’ 
Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779 (1974) (arguing that some exemptions do not help guard 
against destitution, but instead protect property held exclusively by members of the middle and 
upper classes). 
 147. Whitford, supra note 27. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.3.2, at 254. 
 150. BROWN, supra note 29, § 6:70. 
 151. Many debtors who participate in in personam proceedings, however, are unlikely to 
be represented. See Barauski, supra note 13. 
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particularly likely to forfeit exempt property to collectors. Regardless 
of the validity of the underlying judgment or the debtor’s 
entitlement to specific exemptions, a debtor threatened with 
imprisonment may feel exceptional pressure to satisfy the debt 
collector’s claim.152 As described in a Maryland collection practice 
guide, “[b]ody attachments are usually rather effective, as most 
debtors do not like to be imprisoned and suddenly find funds for 
bonds.”153 Thus, the coercive nature of in personam collection 
proceedings—coupled with debtors’ lack of familiarity with their 
exemption rights—increases the likelihood that debtors will forfeit 
exempt property to creditors.  
The risk that debtors will forfeit exempt property to creditors 
raises normative concerns, since federal and state exemption laws are 
intended to protect debtors’ livelihood.154 A debtor (especially a low-
income debtor) facing one or more collection attempts can seek 
refuge in exemption laws, which are designed to protect debtors and 
their families from destitution, and to provide debtors with a means 
of financial rehabilitation.155 These rights are not purely 
humanitarian or magnanimous, however. Exemption laws prevent 
debtors from becoming charges of the state who rely primarily or 
exclusively on taxpayer support.156 Thus, it is crucial to ensure that 
debtors—for whose benefit exemption laws were implemented and 
whose effective utilization of these rights benefits society as a 
whole—do not unwittingly abandon these protections. 
IV. REDUCING THE HARMS OF AND IMPROVING THE LAWS 
GOVERNING IN PERSONAM DEBT COLLECTION 
In this section, I first discuss the psychological, familial, and 
social consequences of in personam proceedings—consequences 
created and exacerbated by the specific debtor behaviors and the 
 
 152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 153. MD. INST. FOR CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. OF LAWYERS, PRACTICE MANUAL FOR 
THE MARYLAND LAWYER § 6.33 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL]. 
 154. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.2.1, at 239. 
 155. Id. 
 156. E.g., In re Hersch, 23 B.R. 42, 45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (“[E]xemption laws 
have always been liberally construed in favor of the claim in order to achieve the beneficial 
purpose for which it was created: to preserve home and shelter for the family, so as to prevent 
the family from becoming a public charge.”). 
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unique qualities of in personam proceedings discussed above.157 I 
then analyze the incongruity between two realities of in personam 
proceedings: (1) the fact that most courts have labeled “nonpayment 
contempt” as illegal but have regarded “nonappearance contempt” 
as legal and largely benign, and (2) the risk that both sanctions pose 
similar harms to debtors and society.  
While recent proposed amendments to debt collection laws 
would help remedy fundamental defects in the collection system, 
these proposals would fail to directly address specific problems with 
in personam debt collection actions. Thus, to fill in key regulatory 
gaps, this Article recommends two fundamental reforms that are 
necessary to establish greater equilibrium between debtors and 
creditors in in personam proceedings. 
A. The Normative Harms of Excessively Coercive Debt Collection  
In crafting modern debt collection law, Congress recognized 
that a collection system unchecked by procedural protections for 
debtors risks contributing to societal dysfunction by triggering 
various psychological, financial, and familial harms and 
externalities.158 Congress’s passage of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA) was motivated in large part by a finding that 
debt collector harassment contributed to a number of social ills, 
including personal bankruptcies, marital instability, job losses, and 
invasions of personal privacy.159 In an attempt to reduce these harms, 
 
 157. See supra Parts III.A–C. 
 158. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2006) (listing in congressional findings and 
declaration of purpose harms caused by abusive debt collection practices). In finding that 
abusive debt collection contributes to numerous social harms, id., the FDCPA’s supporters 
concluded that most debtors defaulted on their loan obligations involuntarily, not 
opportunistically. S. REP. 95-382, at 1697 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 
1977 WL 16047 (“One of the most frequent fallacies concerning debt collection legislation is 
the contention that the primary beneficiaries are ‘deadbeats.’ In fact, however . . . the number 
of persons who willfully refuse to pay just debts is miniscule.”). This proposition, however, is 
part of an intractable debate in bankruptcy and consumer law about individuals’ ability to 
control their financial lives. See, e.g, Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer 
Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1933, 1946–49 (2011) (describing the longstanding debate about whether a reduction in the 
“stigma” associated with bankruptcy had contributed to a historic and dramatic increase in the 
number of individuals seeking bankruptcy relief). 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (listing in Congressional findings and declaration of purpose 
specific social problems caused by abusive debt collection practices). 
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the FDCPA prohibits third-party debt collectors from engaging in 
specific abusive, misleading, or unfair conduct.160  
Some of these prohibited practices reflect a tendency among 
certain debt collectors to conflate civil and criminal liability in an 
attempt to shame or scare debtors into repaying debts.161 For 
example, a debt collector may not represent that nonpayment of any 
debt will result in arrest or imprisonment unless such enforcement is 
lawful,162 may not falsely imply that the consumer committed any 
crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer,163 and 
may not solicit a postdated check164 from a debtor for the purpose of 
threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.165 
The worst harms suffered by debtors in the in personam debt 
collection context—ones that conflate civil and criminal liability,166 
inflict psychological stress,167 and increase the risk of creditor 
coercion168—are precisely those types of harms that the FDCPA has 
targeted. Consider, for example, the experiences of two in personam 
debtors. One “no-show” debtor was imprisoned for two nights after 
being handcuffed in front of his children.169 Although he 
acknowledged the debt was valid, the debtor described the 
experience as “[t]he scariest thing that ever happened to [him].”170 
Another debtor suffered serious chronic psychological stress—
 
 160. See, e.g., NICKLES & EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 34.  
 161. See, e.g., id. at 1 (describing how collection practices are designed around “debtor-
held notions of morality (including duty and guilt)” and “principles of human psychology 
(including duty, guilt, and fear of embarrassment and loss)”). 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(4). 
 163. Id. § 1692(e)(7). 
 164.  Many have raised concerns that debt collectors misuse civil or criminal dishonored 
check statutes, or “bad check” laws, to extract payment from debtors. See, e.g., SHELDON ET 
AL., supra note 3, § 9.1, at 145. These statutes have a legitimate goal of deterring individuals 
from writing checks that will be dishonored. Id. Some debt collectors, however, deliberately 
solicit postdated checks from financially distressed consumers, knowing that the possibility of 
dishonored check prosecution provides the collector with powerful collection leverage. Id. As 
one court observed, bad check laws “lend themselves to use by the unscrupulous who seek 
only payment of debts and have no interest in criminal prosecution other than . . . [to collect] 
money allegedly due them.” Tolbert v. State, 321 So. 2d 227, 232 (Ala. 1975). 
 165. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 1692(f)(3). 
 166.  See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See infra notes 174–176 and accompanying text. 
 168.  See supra notes 89, 93–95, 152 and accompanying text. 
 169. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 17, 2011, at C1. 
 170. Id. 
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including recurring panic attacks, an inability to travel, and 
claustrophobia—after being arrested following her failure to appear 
at a debtor’s examination.171  
In personam debt collection, moreover, can have a large impact 
on debtors’ already precarious financial lives. To the extent that in 
personam proceedings place pressure on debtors to borrow money 
from friends or family or from fringe lending sources (often at 
exorbitant interest rates172), debtors may dig themselves deeper into 
a financial morass.173 Debtors faced with the prospect of even 
temporary incarceration might agree to pay debts to avoid work and 
childcare disruptions—concerns that might explain debtors’ failure 
to appear in court in the first place.174 
Those debtors who suffer the most serious financial and 
psychological consequences of in personam debt collection would 
presumably be prime candidates for bankruptcy relief. Bankruptcy—a 
critical safety valve for financial failure—would provide the 
immediate protection of an automatic stay175 to debtors seeking a 
reprieve from the most coercive effects of in personam proceedings. 
The automatic stay functions as a “time-out,” forcing creditors to 
stop all collection activity in an effort to provide the debtor with 
“breathing room.”176 Likewise, in an attempt to promote equality of 
distribution among all similarly situated creditors, a bankruptcy filing 
requires creditors who received payment from the debtor in the 
ninety-day prefiling period to return that money to the trustee.177  
 
 171. Caldwell v. McMahan’s of Lancaster, Inc. (In re Caldwell), No. 05-66074-fra13, 
Adv. No. 06-6270-fra, 2006 WL 3541931, at *2 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 7, 2006). 
 172. See Martin, supra note 12, at 564. 
 173. See, e.g., SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 2.1.6, at 9 (describing generally how debt 
collection litigation can have serious consequences for the consumer’s—especially a low-
income consumer’s—assets and income). 
 174. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 175. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); see, e.g., Caldwell, 2006 WL 3541931, at *1–*2 (awarding 
debtor $50,000 for damage suffered when creditor, in violation of automatic stay, sought 
debtor’s arrest after debtor’s failure to appear at debtor’s examination); In re Atkins, 178 B.R. 
998, 1001, 1010 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) (creditor was found to have willfully violated the 
automatic stay in a case where the debtor was arrested on the strength of a bench warrant 
issued in pre-bankruptcy proceeding). 
 176. In re Chesnut, 422 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The automatic 
stay . . . provid[es] ‘breathing room’ for a debtor and the bankruptcy court to institute an 
organized repayment plan.”). 
 177. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006). 
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Surprisingly, however, bankruptcy might not be a viable option 
for many debtors facing in personam collection actions. Professor 
Richard Hynes has found that relatively few debtors who have been 
sued in state court ultimately file for bankruptcy.178 Hynes explains 
that these nonfiling debtors tend to be poorer than most bankruptcy 
filers, suggesting that nonfilers may be too poor to file for 
bankruptcy.179 
Hynes’s conclusion is consistent with the results of a study 
conducted by Professor Michele White, who found that many 
debtors in serious financial distress do not file for bankruptcy.180 
According to Professors Katherine Porter and Ronald Mann, debtors 
tend to file once they have saved up enough money to pay for 
bankruptcy attorneys’ fees and court costs.181  
These findings suggest that the cost of a bankruptcy filing might 
deter even those facing in personam actions from seeking bankruptcy 
protection. If debtors are too poor to seek refuge in bankruptcy law, 
these individuals might choose an alternate path and opt to pay the 
most aggressive creditors from “last resort” sources, like exempt 
assets, loans from family and friends, and fringe credit lenders.182 
Thus, as with many of life’s complications, the harms of in 
personam debt collection might be borne most heavily by the poor, 
raising serious normative concerns. Under traditional law and 
economic theory, one might postulate that a creditor would have 
little interest in instituting in personam litigation against poorer 
debtors, since, presumably, a creditor would be less likely to recoup 
the costs of legal action from a debtor with fewer assets to her name. 
Scholars, however, have established that this proposition is often 
untrue. It may, in reality, be easier for creditors to sue a debtor than 
to determine if she is a viable litigation target.183  
Because those debtors who suffer the worst harms of in 
personam debt collection might be too poor to seek refuge in 
 
 178. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in 
State Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2008) (finding that less than twenty percent of Virginia 
consumers sued in 2001 filed for bankruptcy by 2006).  
 179. See id. at 6. 
 180. See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1998).  
 181. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 
289, 290 (2010). 
 183.  See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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bankruptcy, it is critical to determine how in personam debt 
collection procedures can be improved. The goals must be to 
simultaneously preserve in personam debt collection actions as a 
necessary “nuclear option” exercisable against debtors who are able 
but unwilling to repay their judgment creditors, and to prevent 
creditors from using these proceedings more coercively and 
indiscriminately against less sophisticated, sometimes judgment-
proof debtors.  
B. “Contempt Confusion”: Conflating Imprisonment for Failure to 
Show Up and Imprisonment for Failure to Pay Up 
The twin goals of in personam proceedings—discovery and 
collection—create efficiencies for debt collectors attempting to 
extract payment from debtors as quickly and as inexpensively as 
possible. Yet, due to various factors discussed above—the structure 
of in personam remedies, creditors’ incentives in a competitive 
collection process, and unsophisticated debtors’ predictable 
responses to the initiation of these proceedings184—in personam 
proceedings appear to function far more coercively in practice than 
courts and regulators have been willing to concede. 
In this section, I discuss how the legal system treats very 
differently two separate sanctions that, in reality, generate similar 
consequences and harms: (1) contempt for failure to appear in court 
or for failure to otherwise comply with requests for information 
(“nonappearance contempt”) and (2) contempt for failure to turn 
over money or property to the creditor (“nonpayment contempt”).  
1. How the law treats nonpayment and nonappearance contempt 
differently 
Only about one-third of states authorize nonpayment 
contempt,185 a sanction intended, among other things, to coerce an 
able but unwilling debtor to repay her creditor. More and more 
courts have grown reluctant to use their contempt authority to 
threaten to imprison even decidedly “can-pay” debtors for failure to 
comply with courts’ directives to turn over money or property to 
creditors.186 These courts have concluded that this exercise of their 
 
 184. See discussion supra Parts III.A–C. 
 185. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 169, at C1. 
 186. See, e.g., Carter v. Grace Whitney Props., 939 N.E.2d 630, 635–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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contempt authority is unconstitutional,187 since it is functionally 
equivalent to imprisoning debtors for default, a practice illegal in 
every state.188  
Increasingly, the prohibition on imprisonment for debt default 
has been equated with a consumer protection rule,189 one largely 
consistent with the historical movement in the law toward reasonable 
limitations on the harshness of collection tactics.190 By regarding 
courts’ use of their contempt authority as illegal imprisonment for 
debt default, courts continue to breathe life into this constitutional 
prohibition, validating public perceptions of the rule as a form of 
protection against aggressive collection practices.  
Even though most courts ban judges’ exercise of their contempt 
authority to enforce money judgments, all courts generally authorize 
the use of nonappearance contempt in in personam proceedings.191 
The rationale of nonappearance contempt is ostensibly clear and 
 
2010); In re Byrom, 316 S.W.3d 787, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
 187. See, e.g., Pineiro v. Pineiro, 988 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding 
that enforcing through contempt debts other than familial support obligations violates 
Florida’s prohibition against imprisonment for debt); Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444, 447 
(Ind. 1993) (“[T]he general rule that money judgments are not enforceable by contempt 
remains unaffected by our decision today.”); Carter, 939 N.E.2d at 635 (noting that because 
parties may enforce obligations to pay a fixed sum of money through execution, all forms of 
contempt are generally unavailable to enforce a monetary obligation); Brown v. Brown, 412 
A.2d 396, 403 (Md. 1980) (“[I]ncarceration is not an available remedy for the enforcement of 
money decrees . . . .”); Byrom, 316 S.W.3d at 792 (in habeas proceeding, holding 
unconstitutional a contempt order requiring independent executor of estate to pay $85,000 
into court registry or be jailed for contempt). 
 188. See SHELDON ET AL., supra note 3, at 346–47. 
 189. See STANLEY G. HILTON, TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY: INSIDER SECRETS TO BEATING 
CREDIT CARD DEBT AND CREDITORS 184 (2003) (“The debtor’s prison was transplanted 
from the mother country to the United States in the early decades of our country’s existence. 
It eventually found itself cast into the ash heap of history and condemned as an ‘inhumane’ 
and irrational procedure for hounding debtors.”); ROBIN LEONARD & JOHN C. LAMB, SOLVE 
YOUR MONEY TROUBLES: GET DEBT COLLECTORS OFF YOUR BACK & REGAIN FINANCIAL 
FREEDOM 126 (2007) (“The mere thought of debtors’ prison probably sends shivers up your 
spine. . . . As unusual and cruel as it seems today, debtors’ prison was a major collection 
method in the 18th and mid-19th centuries of our republic.”). 
 190. Congress’s passage of the FDCPA in 1977, for example, reflected an important 
change in regulators’ approach toward debt collection abuses. According to consumer 
advocates, Congress—in passing the FDCPA—acknowledged that most delinquency is not 
intentional. See HOBBS, supra note 2, § 1.4.2, at 3. Under this view, the Act rejects “the myth 
of substantial numbers of deadbeats justifying draconian collection tactics.” Id. Congress, in 
passing the FDCPA, acknowledged that society has an interest in imposing reasonable 
limitations on coercion in the debt collection process.  
 191. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(1) (allowing failure to comply with discovery order 
to be treated as contempt of court).  
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defensible: litigants cannot opt out of the legal system by ignoring 
summonses or requests for information.192 Under this view, every 
citizen must be prepared to participate in the legal process if a court 
deems her cooperation necessary to the administration of justice.  
2. The functional similarities between nonappearance and nonpayment 
contempt 
In concluding that nonappearance contempt is necessary to the 
administration of justice and simultaneously rejecting nonpayment 
contempt as unconstitutional, the legal system is adopting a 
misguided position about the functional consequences of each 
sanction. Specifically, by treating nonpayment contempt as illegal 
and nonappearance contempt as legal, the law is treating the two 
sanctions as substantially distinguishable when, in fact, both forms of 
contempt can function as excessively coercive collection techniques. 
Undoubtedly, there is an important legal distinction between 
threatening to imprison debtors for failing to show up to in 
personam proceedings and threatening to incarcerate debtors for 
failing to forfeit money or property to creditors. The specific and 
immediate objective of nonappearance contempt is to put pressure 
on the debtor to appear in court and provide information about 
what assets she owns and where they are located. A debtor may 
purge herself of nonappearance contempt by physically appearing at 
the courthouse and truthfully answering questions about her 
property—a seemingly reasonable, non-onerous request.  
In contrast, the plain goal of nonpayment contempt is to force a 
debtor to turn over money or property to a creditor. Even though a 
court may only threaten to imprison for nonpayment a debtor who, 
the court finds, is capable of compliance,193 nonpayment contempt is 
more controversial. Nonpayment contempt, which most courts 
equate with the unconstitutional imprisonment for debt default, is 
entangled in the complicated legacy of debtors’ prisons. And in a 
legal system that acknowledges the inevitability of financial failure,194 
 
 192. See Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) (“If a party 
can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have been issued, and by his own act 
of disobedience set them aside, then are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now 
fittingly calls the ‘judicial power of the United States’ would be a mere mockery.”). 
 193. See sources cited supra note 79. 
 194. See Mann & Porter, supra note 181, at 291 (describing bankruptcy as the United 
States’ “institutional remedy” for financial distress). 
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nonpayment contempt has been perceived as an unduly harsh way to 
sanction a debtor.195 
In spite of the differences in the legality and legitimacy of 
nonappearance and nonpayment contempt (as well as critical 
differences in how a debtor may purge herself of each form of 
contempt), ordinary debtors may be less sensitive to these 
distinctions. Once a “no-show” debtor is arrested or threatened with 
arrest, she may find it difficult to distinguish between the immediate 
source of the arrest threat, her failure to appear in court, and the 
proximate cause of the threat of incarceration: the debt default itself.  
I label this problem as “contempt confusion”: a nonappearance 
contemnor-debtor’s propensity to conclude that the threat of 
incarceration is a punishment or sanction for failing to pay a creditor. 
Because of contempt confusion, the debtor may reasonably conclude 
that the path of least resistance in response to the institution of 
nonappearance contempt sanctions is to pay the debt. 
Encouraging a “no-show” debtor to capitulate and turn over 
funds to the creditor is not in and of itself problematic, nor is it a 
message that a creditor must be discouraged from sending. Any 
litigant has the right to vigorously pursue legal remedies to, among 
other things, signal to her opponent that the litigant will be a 
vigilant and formidable adversary and that the costs of litigation 
(including the costs of attending an in personam proceeding) may 
render capitulation or settlement worthwhile. 
If, however, a creditor can institute in personam proceedings 
imprecisely (without regard to the true ability of a debtor to satisfy 
the judgment), contempt confusion can yield consequences similar 
to those triggered by “nuisance value” claims in civil litigation. 
“Nuisance value” refers to a litigant’s ability to assert a meritless 
claim or defense in the pursuit of a payoff that the other party 
sacrifices to rid herself of the bothersome litigation.196 The other 
party calculates the payoff by estimating the cost of successfully 
 
 195. See, e.g., Ressler, supra note 42, at 386–88 (expressing concerns that indefinite 
imprisonment for non-payment inflicts hardship on the contemnor’s family and creates 
difficulties for contemnors who, once released, seek to return to the work force). But see, e.g., 
Richard E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: 
Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 143–45 (2002) (supporting the 
use of criminal penalties for debt default). 
 196. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2004). 
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defending against the weak or meritless claim.197 While the creditor’s 
underlying claim in the in personam debt collection context is 
hopefully most often not meritless,198 the creditor’s legal entitlement 
to the assets that the debtor-contemnor may feel pressure to forfeit 
may be less clear.  
Thus, courts cannot ignore the two-fold risk that (1) the court’s 
threat to imprison the debtor for failure to appear in court places 
direct or indirect pressure on the debtor to capitulate and pay the 
underlying debt,199 and (2) the debtor neglects her right to claim 
exemptions or contest the underlying debt due to information 
asymmetries between the debtor and the creditor, the debtor’s pro se 
status, a lack of court oversight, and the debtor’s lack of 
sophistication.200 
 In practice, a court that threatens to imprison a “no-show” 
debtor is not merely enforcing discovery obligations. The two 
functions of in personam proceedings—discovery and collection—are 
inextricably intertwined. Thus, based on the debtor’s perceived costs 
and benefits of turning over money or property to her creditor to 
settle the dispute, a court’s threat to imprison a debtor for failure to 
appear in court can put direct pressure on the debtor to pay the 
creditor. Even a poor or judgment-proof debtor may perceive 
payment as the safest option. 
The risk of “contempt confusion” is precisely the type of risk that 
modern consumer protection laws have attempted to ameliorate. 
One can expect that creditors will be formidable adversaries, and that 
they may utilize all rights afforded to them under collection laws. 
Currently, however, when the state threatens imprisonment, there is 
a risk that a debtor, without asserting key procedural and substantive 
rights, will perceive payment of the debt as the path of least 
resistance.201 It is at this point the law must intervene. Targeted legal 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Consumer advocates and some judges, however, have raised concerns that some 
collectors regularly sue on time-barred debt, a violation of the FDCPA. FTC, supra note 5, at 
23, 29. 
 199. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
 200. See discussion supra Part III.A–C. 
 201. Cf. Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 
MO. L. REV. 707, 710–11 (2008) (noting that while inequities in the legal system cannot be 
eradicated, debt buyers’ lawsuits against unrepresented consumers on time-barred debts 
undermine the adversarial process). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1548 
reforms can attempt to establish a fairer bargaining relationship 
between debtors and creditors. 
C. The Inadequacy of Proposed Reforms 
Recently, various groups—most notably the FTC—have 
proposed significant changes to federal and state debt collection 
laws.202 These groups have suggested that the aging laws governing 
debt collection are ripe for reform203 given stark changes in the legal 
landscape, including a rising tide of collection actions204 and the 
growth of the debt-buying industry.205 
In a recent report, the FTC addressed specific concerns about 
the debt collection industry: (1) collectors’ tendency to sue debtors 
with little evidence of the underlying debt;206 (2) “sewer service”;207 
(3) the high rate of default judgments;208 (4) collectors’ improper 
garnishment of exempt funds in debtors’ bank accounts;209 and (5) 
creditors’ suits on time-barred debts—a prohibited “unfair” practice 
under the FTC Act.210 In response to these concerns, the FTC 
encouraged states to pursue specific reforms, including (1) adopting 
measures to increase the likelihood that consumers will defend or 
otherwise participate in litigation;211 (2) requiring collectors to 
include in their complaints more information about the underlying 
debt;212 and (3) mandating that collectors disclose to consumers that 
filing suit on time-barred debt is illegal.213  
 
 202. See FTC, supra note 5; RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: HOW THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS CONSUMERS 
AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 8 (2010). 
 203. JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 202, at 1. 
 204. FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
CHANGE—A WORKSHOP REPORT 55–56 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf. 
 205. JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 202, at 18. 
 206. FTC, supra note 5, at 16–18. 
 207. Id. at 8–12. 
 208. Id. at 7. 
 209. Id. at 31–35. 
 210. Id. at 23. 
 211. Id. at 13. 
 212. Id. at 17, 19. 
 213. Id. at 26–27. The FTC has also endorsed federal and state-level adoption of laws 
that would limit the amount that banks can freeze in accounts holding debtor-depositors’ 
exempt funds (e.g., Social Security or disability payments). FTC, supra note 5, at iv. 
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These reforms are long overdue. They would help improve the 
accuracy and legitimacy of courts’ judgments. Because of these 
problems—in particular, debtors’ frequent failure to defend against 
collection actions214—one can be less confident that a judgment 
represents a true and accurate adjudication of a debtor’s liability to a 
creditor. Frequently, the first time a debtor may learn of (or truly 
understand) a judgment or its consequences may be at the collection 
stage.215 In essence, the judicial system’s division of labor between 
adjudication and judgment enforcement has broken down, placing 
an increased burden on judges at the collection stage to help ensure 
that judgments are accurate.216 
These reforms, however, would do little to directly remedy 
specific problems with in personam actions. While some concerns 
about in personam collection actions relate to doubts about the 
legitimacy of creditors’ underlying judgments, the judgment stage is 
only a prerequisite to collection—and the source of only a portion of 
the complications plaguing debtors. 
In 2010, in response to a newspaper report about problems with 
in personam debt collection actions,217 Senator Al Franken 
introduced legislation proposing to amend the FDCPA to, among 
other things, provide enhanced validation notices218 to consumers 
and improve the process by which consumers dispute their debts.219 
One provision of the bill, moreover, proposes to amend the FDCPA 
by prohibiting a debt collector from seeking a warrant for the 
 
 214. See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
 215. Highland, supra note 144. 
 216. Debtors may be able to raise substantive defenses to the judgment at the in 
personam collection phase, but their right to do so may be limited. E-mail from the Hon. Paul 
M. Fullerton, Assoc. Judge, DuPage Cnty., Ill., 18th Jud. Cir., to Lea Shepard, Assistant 
Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law (Jan. 10, 2011) (on file with author). 
 217. 156 CONG. REC. S7801 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken) 
(“The problems in the debt collection industry first came to my attention in June, when my 
hometown newspaper, the Star Tribune, began a series on the subject about the story about 
the Minnesotans who have landed in jail because debt collectors were pursuing them for a 
debt.”). 
 218. Under the FDCPA, debt collectors must provide consumers with a validation 
notice—a description of the debt and the debtor’s right to seek verification of the debt—
within five days after the collector’s initial communication with the debtor. See 15 U.S.C. § 
1692(g)(a) (2006). This requirement attempts to prevent collectors from “dunning the wrong 
person” (or a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy) or from “attempting to collect debts that 
the consumer has already paid.” PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 20, § 12.13, at 149. 
 219. S. 3888, 111th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2010). 
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debtor’s arrest from a court or any law enforcement agency.220 Since, 
however, the bill explicitly provides that this provision would have 
no effect on a court’s inherent authority to hold a debtor in civil 
contempt,221 this legislation—if reintroduced in Congress—would 
likely have no effect on any of the coercive in personam debt-
collection practices described in this Article. 
D. Recommendations 
1. How turning over bond payments to creditors perpetuates contempt 
confusion 
In many states, the law perpetuates “contempt confusion”222—
the conflation of nonappearance and nonpayment contempt—by 
turning over bond funds directly to creditors. When a debtor fails to 
appear at an in personam action, the court may eventually issue a 
body attachment writ—an arrest warrant—against her. When a 
debtor is arrested for failing to appear in court (or is asked to 
surrender herself to law enforcement authorities), she must post a 
bond to secure her appearance at a subsequent contempt hearing. 
While some courts release a debtor with only a signature (or 
recognizance bond),223 others require debtors to post a cash bond.224 
The bond may be set at the amount of the judgment,225 and, after 
court costs are deducted, the bond money is generally turned over to 
the creditor in partial or full satisfaction of its judgment.226  
 
 220. Id. § 5(a). 
 221. Id. § 5(b). 
 222. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 223. One example of a signature bond is Illinois’ “I-Bond,” which allows the debtor to 
be released without posting any money. Cook Cnty. Pub. Defender, Guide to the Criminal 
Justice System, COOK COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ILLINOIS, http://www.cookcountygov.com/ 
portal/server.pt/community/public_defender,_law%20_office_of/260/guide_to_the_criminal
_justice_system (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
 224. Dore, supra note 116. If, for example, an Illinois judge sets a type of cash bond—a 
“D bond”—the debtor (or someone on the debtor’s behalf) must post 10% of the bond 
amount before she will be released. Cook Cnty. Public Defender, supra note 223. 
 225. See, e.g., PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 153, § 6.33 (advising collection attorneys 
to “[b]e sure to request the bond in the amount to cover the full unpaid balance of the debt, 
including post-judgment interest of 10 percent, attorney’s fees (if applicable), and costs”); 
Serres & Howatt, supra note 36. 
 226. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 224, § 21 (West 2000) (providing that supplementary 
proceedings will be dismissed and the debtor shall be released “on payment in full to the 
creditor” or upon “giving to the creditor . . . a bond, . . . with sufficient surety[,] . . . approved 
by the creditor, . . . conditioned that the debtor shall pay to the creditor the amount due on 
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Every state prohibits imprisonment for ordinary civil debts,227 
and, in some states, courts have concluded that use of their 
contempt authority to compel “can-pay” debtors to turn over money 
or property to creditors falls within this prohibition.228 Even, 
however, in jurisdictions that ban courts from sanctioning “can-
pay”229 debtors for failure to turn over money or property to 
creditors, courts can (1) imprison a debtor who fails to show up at 
an in personam proceeding, (2) force that debtor to post a bond to 
secure her appearance at a subsequent contempt hearing, and (3) 
turn over that bond money to the collector in satisfaction of its 
judgment.230 This is the functional equivalent of threatening to 
incarcerate a debtor for defaulting on a credit obligation. In essence, 
courts’ practice of turning over bond money to creditors in 
nonappearance cases substantively transforms nonappearance cases to 
nonpayment contempt cases, which violates states’ prohibitions on 
imprisonment for debt. As Professor Alan White has explained, “[i]f, 
in effect, people are being incarcerated until they pay bail, and bail is 
being used to pay their debts, then they’re being incarcerated to pay 
their debts.” 231 
This practice is harmful, since a debtor anxious to secure her 
release will be desperate to procure bond funds through any available 
means, such as through a credit card cash advance, a loan from a 
friend or family member, a payday loan, or forfeiture of exempt 
property.232 Thus, I propose that bond money should only be used 
to secure a debtor’s appearance at a subsequent hearing—not to 
expedite the creditor’s collection efforts. Court procedures intended 
 
the judgment . . . within sixty days . . . or within such longer time as the court may allow.”). 
 227. See supra note 39. 
 228. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. 
 229. In any contempt action, a person may not be imprisoned or sanctioned if she is 
incapable of complying with the court order. See, e.g., United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 
752, 757 (1983) (“In a civil contempt proceeding such as this, of course, a defendant may 
assert a present inability to comply with the order in question. . . . Where compliance is 
impossible, neither the moving party nor the court has any reason to proceed with the civil 
contempt action.” (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)); George v. Beard, 824 A.2d 393, 
396 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (“Before an offender can be confined solely for nonpayment of 
financial obligations he or she must be given an opportunity to establish inability to pay.”). 
 230. See, e.g., In re Butler, No. 07–81047, 2011 WL 806078, at *1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
Mar. 2, 2011). 
 231. Chris Serres, Debtors and the New Breed of Collectors: Is Jailing Debtors the Same as 
Debtors’ Jail?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 6, 2010, at A9. 
 232. See supra note 140.  
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to expedite collection efforts must not compromise other important 
societal interests, including the protection of exempt property and 
reasonable limits on the coerciveness of debt collection procedures. 
2. Putting your money where your mouth is: Protecting debtors’ exempt 
property to sustain exemption laws’ normative goals 
In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) its protected status, exempt 
property has always been vulnerable to creditors’ collection efforts. 
Because a debtor’s right to claim property as exempt requires her to 
be familiar with her exemption rights and how to assert them, 
exempt property can easily be forfeited—either knowingly or 
unwittingly—to creditors.233 While this problem is not unique to in 
personam debt collection,234 various groups—including the FTC, 
debtors’ attorneys, creditors’ attorneys, judges, and debtors 
themselves—have observed that debtors, either under pressure from 
courts or creditors or in ignorance of their exemption rights, are at 
risk of sacrificing exempt property to creditors in in personam 
proceedings.235 
To protect exempt property and to safeguard the important 
policies advanced by exemption rights,236 I propose that judges take 
an active role in ensuring that debtors do not unknowingly or 
involuntarily turn over exempt money or property to creditors. 
Specifically, I propose that once a collector has instituted an in 
personam proceeding, the judge be required to confirm that a 
debtor who transfers money or property to a collector in any in-
court payment plan237 or out-of-court settlement is not unknowingly 
forfeiting retirement assets or other exempt property. 
Some sympathetic judges (and even some debt collectors238) may 
already prod unrepresented debtors into asserting their rights by, for 
example, asking debtors who appear before them whether or not the 
 
 233. See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 234. The FTC and others have expressed concern that banks and creditors are improperly 
freezing exempt funds in debtors’ bank accounts. FTC, supra note 5, at iv. To remedy this 
problem, the FTC has encouraged states and the federal government to adopt laws limiting the 
amount that banks can freeze in accounts holding debtor-depositors’ exempt funds. Id. 
 235. See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text; sources cited supra note 144. 
 236. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 237. For an example of a judge attempting to create a payment plan, see Button v. James, 
909 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
 238. Barauski, supra note 13. 
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debtors are choosing to claim any exemptions.239 The probability 
that a particular judge will actually inform a debtor of her exemption 
rights, however, is currently likely to vary significantly among 
members of the bench. Because judges must strive to be impartial 
and disinterested, a judge may understandably feel uncomfortable 
independently raising the topic of exemptions with a debtor.240 A 
judge who does so may be accused of improper advocacy. For this 
reason, a specific directive to judges—a change in the law or a local 
court rule—is necessary to reduce the risk that a debtor will 
unknowingly sacrifice exempt property to creditors. 
Undoubtedly, this proposal will increase administrative burdens 
on courts already overloaded with cases. Thus, one might instead 
propose cheaper alternatives that do not require the court’s 
intervention: for example, a requirement (1) that collection attorneys 
disclose to debtors information about their exemption rights, and/or 
(2) that the court provide debtors with a standardized form 
describing in “plain English” what property is protected under state 
and federal exemption laws. 
For example, the creditor could be required to represent to the 
court that the creditor has informed the debtor of available 
exemptions (e.g., by providing the debtor with a standardized 
disclosure form describing categories of property exempt under state 
and federal law). In addition, the creditor could be required to 
represent either that (1) the creditor has made a reasonable 
investigation into the source of the funds the debtor proposes to 
transfer to the creditor, and the creditor believes that the debtor is 
not forfeiting any exempt property, or (2) the debtor is transferring 
exempt property to the creditor, but the attorney and creditor used 
no “unfair or deceptive”241 means to induce the debtor to make such 
a transfer. 
While it would be cheaper to require creditors—and not courts—
to disclose to debtors their exemption rights, a creditor- or 
disclosure-based reform would likely yield few improvements. 
Providing debtors with a disclosure form would duplicate the 
exemption notice requirement in effect in many jurisdictions, as 
 
 239. Grincewicz, supra note 105. 
 240. Fullerton, supra note 16. 
 241. States can consult as persuasive authority courts’ interpretations of “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 
45(a)(1) (2006). 
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some summonses already provide examples of property exempt 
under federal and state law.242 Judges, creditors’ attorneys, and 
debtors’ attorneys report that, in spite of these notices, 
unrepresented debtors frequently fail to assert their exemption 
rights.243 
Courts and regulators, of course, can improve the 
comprehensibility of notices and can even empirically test what types 
of disclosures are the most effective.244 Debtors, however, may not 
read the disclosures in the first place. In addition, given disquietingly 
low levels of financial literacy,245 many debtors may be unable to 
comprehend even the most intelligible of notices. Thus, there is 
reason to be pessimistic that additional or clearer disclosures would 
improve significantly upon the status quo. Indeed, for many years, 
consumer law has been dominated by disclosure requirements, and, 
as a whole, these disclosures have largely been ineffective in 
preventing consumers from making ill-advised decisions.246 
In addition, it is impractical to rely on creditors to help safeguard 
debtors’ exemption rights. Creditors and debtors are legal 
adversaries, and, as long as a debtor’s right to exemptions is not 
“self-executing,”247 it is unrealistic—absent the imposition of a 
controversial248 or underutilized249 enforcement method—to 
 
 242. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1402 (West 2010) (listing in sample 
notice examples of property exempt under federal and state law). 
 243. See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text; sources cited supra note 145. 
 244. Regulators routinely conduct empirical studies to determine what changes to 
regulations would be most effective. See, e.g., JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS (June 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf. 
 245. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Financial Illiteracy, the 
Mortgage Market Collapse, and the Global Economic Crisis, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 181, 185 
(2010) (“Americans of all ages have an alarmingly low level of expertise in what may be 
considered basic, everyday practices relating to money and personal finance.”); Alan M. White 
& Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 235–38 
(2002). 
 246. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 143, at 26–32; Patricia A. McCoy, 
Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 137–38 
(2007); Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or 
How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 769–79 
(2010).  
 247. BROWN, supra note 29, § 6:70. 
 248. Strong consumer law enforcement techniques tend to generate significant 
controversy and thus are often met with significant resistance from various stakeholders, 
including creditors and some regulators. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., COMMENTS 
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anticipate much improvement if such a requirement were 
implemented.  
Requiring judges to ensure that debtors are knowledgeable 
about their exemption rights during in personam proceedings is 
neither radical nor unprecedented. Indeed, similar mandates are 
imposed on judges in other areas of the law.250  
Consider, for example, reaffirmation agreements in consumer 
bankruptcy cases. In every individual debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
case, bankruptcy judges must approve unrepresented debtors’ 
reaffirmation agreements with creditors.251 In a reaffirmation 
agreement, a debtor agrees to repay part or all of a debt (e.g., a 
$3,000 credit card obligation) that would otherwise be discharged in 
the bankruptcy proceeding.252 If the debtor instead allowed the 
court’s discharge to take full effect, she would be absolved from 
repaying the loan.253  
Reaffirmation agreements have been roundly criticized.254 As 
Professor Charles Tabb has posed the issue, “Why would a debtor 
ever do such a crazy thing?”255 Debtors choose to reaffirm debts for 
 
TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD [REGULATION Z; DOCKET NO. R-1390] 12 CFR PART 
226: TRUTH IN LENDING – PROPOSED RULE (2010) (providing one example of consumer law 
advocates’ attempt to defend a powerful consumer remedy—the Truth in Lending Act’s right 
of rescission—against proposed changes inspired by creditors’ and others’ significant resistance 
to the remedy); Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ 
Right of Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 198 (2010) 
(explaining that although courts have strong powers to modify consumers’ mortgage payment 
obligations under the Truth in Lending Act’s rescission provisions, most courts have been 
unwilling to do so). 
 249. See, e.g., Whitford, supra note 27, at 1096 (implying that debtors rarely assert their 
rights in the execution context). 
 250. For example, when a defendant tenders a guilty plea at arraignment, the judge must 
determine, among other things, whether the plea is voluntary and whether the defendant 
understands the charge and the consequences that could follow if the plea is accepted. WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.1, at 994–
1000 (4th ed. 2004). Likewise, courts must serve as “fiduciaries” to class members. JOSEPH M. 
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:4 (7th ed. 2010). In that role, courts 
must approve class action settlements, since the vast majority of the class members whose rights 
will be affected by settlements play no role in the settlement negotiations. Id. 
 251. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(d) (2006). 
 252. See id. §§ 524(c), 727(a)(10).  
 253. This assumes that the debtor would have no other problems receiving the discharge. 
 254. See, e.g., Gary Klein, Suggestions for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission and 
Congress: Eliminate Reaffirmation Agreements, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 528, 529 (1996) 
(suggesting that reaffirmation agreements “serve no legitimate purpose commensurate with the 
cost to the system of the loss of debtors’ fresh starts”). 
 255. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 10.35, at 1027 (2009). 
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various reasons: (1) to retain property that otherwise would be 
forfeited to the creditor in bankruptcy, (2) to protect a non-filing 
cosigner from being pressured to repay the debt, (3) to allay the 
debtor’s post-default guilt or express gratitude to a creditor, or (4) 
to compensate the creditor for a promised new benefit (e.g., a post-
bankruptcy line of credit).256 Some have questioned whether 
reaffirmation agreements subvert bankruptcy’s “fresh start” policy,257 
since reaffirmations chip away at the bankruptcy discharge that the 
debtor presumably needs to regain her financial footing. 
Given widespread concerns about whether or not debtors should 
be permitted to recommit to pay dischargeable debts,258 the 
Bankruptcy Code imposes various substantive and procedural 
restrictions on debtors’ ability to enter into reaffirmation 
agreements.259 For example, before a bankruptcy judge can approve 
an unrepresented debtor’s reaffirmation, the court must hold a 
discharge hearing at which the court must (1) inform the debtor of 
the serious consequences of a reaffirmation,260 (2) determine whether 
the agreement imposes an “undue hardship” on the debtor, and (3) 
decide whether the reaffirmation is in the debtor’s “best interests.”261 
In assessing these factors, the court considers, among other things, 
the unrepresented debtor’s ability to afford the payments that she 
would be required to make under the agreement.262 
One might argue that judicial intervention is more justifiable in 
the reaffirmation context than it is in an in personam proceeding. 
Reaffirmations partially unravel a bankruptcy discharge—the end 
goal of every bankruptcy filer. Reaffirmations thus increase the 
chances that the debtor will face future financial trouble. The 
bankruptcy court’s intervention ensures that the reaffirmation (in 
effect, an action against the debtor’s own self-interest) meets 
minimal standards of reasonableness. 
 
 256. See, e.g., id. at 1027–28. 
 257. Id.  
 258. See, e.g., NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY 
YEARS 145–65 (1997).  
 259. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)–(d), (k)–(m) (2006). 
 260. Id. § 524(d)(1)–(2). 
 261. Id. § 524(c)(6)(A)(i)–(ii). If, however, the debt is a consumer debt secured by real 
property, the court need not approve such an agreement. 
 262. See, e.g., In re Melendez, 224 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998); In re Bryant, 43 
B.R. 189 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).  
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In addition, because a reaffirmation agreement is inconsistent 
with the underlying objective of a bankruptcy proceeding, a judge’s 
oversight is arguably particularly important. In contrast, the 
forfeiture of property—even exempt property—in an in personam 
proceeding is arguably consistent with the larger function of the 
remedy: to help the creditor satisfy its judgment. Thus, one might 
contend that the judge presiding in an in personam proceeding need 
not interfere with a presumably voluntary, rational decision of a 
debtor to sacrifice exempt money or property to a creditor. 
This view of the role of the judiciary, however, is reductionist. It 
also makes unwarranted assumptions about the “voluntariness” of a 
debtor’s decision to turn over exempt property to a creditor. I 
discuss each issue in turn. 
First, it is misguided to argue that a judge need not interfere 
with an in personam proceeding, provided its larger purpose—the 
collection of debts—is being served. This view minimizes a judge’s 
potentially crucial role in a legal proceeding. Judges are not 
ceremonial notaries who merely rubber-stamp parties’ agreements. 
Rather, it is appropriate for a judge, with constitutional and 
legislative guidance, to intervene to ensure that any legally significant 
decision of a debtor—regardless of the purpose of the overall 
proceeding—is truly informed and voluntary. The legal system 
functions most equitably and is more likely to produce the best 
substantive outcome when parties know all of the facts, are familiar 
with their rights, and are capable of asserting them.  
Second, without meaningful judicial scrutiny of the agreements 
that debtors and creditors reach in in personam proceedings, one 
cannot assume that a debtor who turns over exempt property to a 
creditor in an in personam proceeding is doing so voluntarily, with 
full knowledge of her rights.  
Some commentators contend that exempt property functions as a 
“carrot” in negotiations with creditors.263 For example, in exchange 
for a debtor’s agreement to forfeit exempt money or property to a 
creditor, the creditor may agree to certain concessions (for example, 
a reduction in fees).264 Thus, one might argue that requiring a judge 
 
 263. Whitford, supra note 27, at 1062, 1096–97 (“Exemption statutes provide leverage 
most importantly by providing a resource pool—a carrot as it were—from which to offer 
voluntary payments to the creditor in return for appropriate concessions, such as favorable 
refinancing terms or a reduction in the size of the debt.”).  
 264. Id. 
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to interfere with a debtor’s forfeiture of exempt property would 
deprive the debtor of the freedom of negotiating a potentially 
mutually beneficial agreement with the creditor. A debtor might 
forfeit exempt funds, for example, to avoid garnishment—a form of 
collection that could ultimately cause the debtor to lose her job.  
In the context of in personam proceedings, however, the specter 
of imprisonment looms over many debtors.265 Thus, given the 
significant disparity in bargaining power between debtors and 
creditors, there is a risk that a skillful collector perceives exempt 
property more as sitting prey or “fair game” that can help satisfy a 
creditor’s judgment. In the competitive world of collections (a “race 
of the diligent”266 where “first in time is first in right”267), creditors 
who successfully capitalize on “contempt confusion” and persuade 
debtors to forfeit exempt funds can come out ahead. Only in the 
hands of the most legally sophisticated debtors is exempt property 
comparable to a carrot that can be skillfully dangled and maneuvered 
to extract concessions from creditors.  
Thus, it is crucial for judges presiding over in personam 
proceedings to recognize that, although these remedies are designed 
to help creditors satisfy their judgments, judges must function 
independently to protect the adjudicative integrity of the collection 
system. Particularly where there exists a discrepancy in bargaining 
power between repeat-player creditors and less sophisticated and 
possibly unrepresented debtors, courts’ contempt authority cannot 
be diverted to purely private ends.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In personam actions, important innovations in the law of debt 
collection, are useful to creditors. Creditors benefit significantly from 
an ability to combine discovery and collection in one proceeding and 
to shift much of the onus of debt collection to debtors. This Article 
raises the concern, however, that many of the efficiencies of modern 
in personam debt collection actions are products of collectors’ ability 
to capitalize on debtors’ lack of sophistication, debtors’ lack of 
 
 265. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 267. See Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827) (“The principle is 
believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior 
satisfaction . . . .”). 
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participation in the debt collection process, and the in terrorem 
effects of courts’ exercise of their contempt authority.  
For this reason, it is crucial to ensure that a creditor’s ability to 
institute in personam actions—and to influence the potential 
deployment of law enforcement—does not undermine other 
important social and economic goals, including (1) the preservation 
of debtors’ exemption rights, and (2) the imposition of reasonable 
limitations on the coerciveness of debt collection. These goals can be 
advanced by requiring judges to inform debtors about their 
exemption rights before creditors may reap any financial rewards 
from the institution of in personam actions, and by eliminating 
creditors’ access to bond funds—money extracted from debtors 
under the most stressful conditions, and funds whose sources may 
reflect the highest levels of debtor desperation. These reforms 
attempt to reduce or eliminate those creditor incentives and 
behaviors that unfairly harm debtors and undermine the procedural 
and substantive legitimacy of the collection system. 
Of course, one’s view about the wisdom of devoting resources to 
a realignment of leverage and bargaining power in in personam 
proceedings inevitably implicates an intractable debate about 
debtors’ personal responsibility. In spite of compelling evidence to 
the contrary,268 many see debt default—and, by extension, 
complications in the collection process—as a largely preventable and 
predictable consequence of unwise financial and lifestyle choices. 
Proponents of this argument would require debtors to bear the costs 
of their mistakes. 
Undoubtedly, some debtors appear complicit in complicating the 
operation of the debt collection system. Under this view, debtors 
waive their rights by neglecting to defend themselves at the 
judgment stage or by failing to respond to summonses to participate 
in in personam actions. Likewise, debtors fail to fully educate 
themselves about their exemption rights—or may fail to explore 
whether legal aid assistance is available. While it may be tempting to 
categorize debtors as either helpless or recalcitrant and creditors as 
either ruthless or victimized, the realities are often much more 
complicated. A commentator’s observation in a study of the working 
poor seems apt here as well: “[these] individuals . . . are neither 
 
 268. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 14–22 (2000); WARREN, 
supra note 21, at 99. 
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helpless nor omnipotent, but stand on various points along the 
spectrum between the polar opposites of personal and societal 
responsibility.”269 
When debtors in droves fail to appear in court, are 
unrepresented, and are ill-equipped to assert their exemptions, one 
must ask probing questions about the fairness of the debt collection 
system. It is crucial to understand why debtors make these harmful 
choices and to consider whether the extent of debtors’ control over 
their pre- and post-default lives may at times be overstated.  
The process by which the legal system adjudicates private 
disputes and assists private parties in enforcing those judgments 
involves a complex balancing of interests of debtors, creditors, and 
the state. Debt collection is a critical component of the consumer 
credit system, and in personam collection actions serve an important 
role in ensuring that judgments are not merely “symbolic.”270 
Without a critical realignment of the balance of power between 
debtors and creditors, however, this system risks losing its legitimacy 
in the public’s eyes, resembling a private collection arm of collectors, 
and sacrificing important societal interests in the name of 
expediency.  
 
 269. DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 6 (2004).  
 270. See LoPucki, supra note 47, at 4. 
